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'1'he rears ot President John Tyler's administration (1841-1845) have 
been largel1 untold in detail in wr historical writings. Scholars have 
generally passed over this period for areas considered more fertile and 
interesting. History has cast Tyler in a shadow, and few Americans today 
know 1111ch about h1lll except that he was the •Tyler too• who ran tor the 
Vioe-Presidenoy on a ticket w1 th someone nicknamed •Tippecanoe.• Few 
American Presidents have desired to be remembered by posterity as in-
- . 
tensely as T.rlers yet he has become one ot America's most obscure Ch1et 
Blceoutives. Only two adequate biographies ot h1lll have appeared in the 
century and more since his death. Professor Oliver Perry Chitwood's 
soholarl:, study was published in 1939, and is the best work 011 Tyler.1 
Robert Seager, II, recently brought out an excellent work on Tyler libich 
emphasimes the social history ot the Tyler and Gardiner f'amilies. 2 
'lbi~ study-of the first two years of ~er•s administration covers 
the most critical years ot bis lite, and is an attempt to show his con-
ruots with Congress. .Although Tyler bad •DY' faults as President, he 
oa,nnot_ be totally blamed tor the breakdown of the laWlllllking prooesses. 
1h1s study' is an attempt to oontriblte more understanc:ling through the use 
ot detail and anal11d• to this inad~ately researched period ot historJ'. 
_ 101.1ver hJ'17 Chitwood, -~ T;rler, Cbaal,ion 2t. the Old South (lew 
Yol'lcl D. ippletoD-CenblrJ' ·0o;;-t939j, 496pages, citedhereinatter as 
Chitwood, .!!!Im ir1,r. 




There are maey individuals who have oontribtlted to this pr:ojecto I 
gratefully acknowledge the assistance of ·Dr. Homer L. Knight and Dl"o Ner-
bert R .. Mahnken, the members of mi: thesis committee, al'1d special grati-
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B1story haa an odd way ot softening the aniaositiea oreated by vigo~ 
ous Presidents who ueul.17 1"Wl atoul ot one ot the other branches of 
goverment vb1le tbe7 are in ottioe. llien hiatorians look baok to judge, 
tbeJ" generall.7 show a decided preterenoe tor the wginative, bold, and 
vigo!'Olls men who have held that high office. lve17 President of the 
Unit.ed States, with the exception ot W,]]1am HeDl'J' Harr1.son, who lived 
onl.7 a month atter he•• inaugurated, has been denounoed aa a despot, a 
tyrant, a dictator, or a man who was using the power ot hie ottice to 
further his pers~ ems.1 Demmoiaticn spared Harrison by death was 
heaped in full measure upon his successor, John Tyler. '1)1.er had been 
in ottice less than halt a 79ar bet ore be found hia political. reputation . 
l"llined by partisan politics, bis aesociation with bis part7 dissolved, 
am his name the object ot vil.1t1cat1on t.hrougbout the country. Oddl.J' 
enough, 'l)ier bad fallen tram grace because he ohoae to use the powers ot 
offloe wit.b vige>r and aomet1aes with boldness. 1'hose trai ta which made 
others creat ud the oppo~ te ettect upon him. 
Umer George Waahington the rederal.ista put into practice the theoey 
of vigol'OUs executive leadership ot CorgreH. llien ilex.amer Ba1.lton 
puaed boa the 8Cene the executive leadenb:1.p of CoJ'IINS• faded, ao that 
when !beau Jettenon aanaed the Preaidenoy: a nn relationship betwen 
lLoQia Brownlow, "lht.J»sident .!D! SM. Pppidenoy (Chioqo I "1bl.io 
AdJdnistntion Seffioe, ·l 7 ., ·pp. 17-18. 
1 
President and Congress had to be established. Jefferson proved to be 
clever and able in guiding Congress by party manipulation and direct 
personal contact 14th his friends strategically placed in both Houses. 
2 
No such skilled manipal.ator followed him until 1828, men .Amrew Jackson 
was elected. For twenv ;rears before Jackson, the executive was reduced 
to impoteme and Congress reigned sa.prem.e. The eclipse or the Presidena;r 
in the shadow of a dominant Congress came to an abl'ttpt end under Jackson. 
He cozmrol.l.ed the executive departments with a firm hand and resorted to 
vigorous and previously unknoz use of the veto. So vigorous was Jack ... 
sones assumption ot leadership, that dismayed Congressmen censured the 
President .tor his USllrpation of power. Jackson retaliated with a 
sa.coess:rul. campaign lihich expunged the censure from the Joa.rnal .!?t. S!_t 
Senate. 2 It is one ot the ironies ot history th.at Tyler, then Senator 
f'rom Virginia, refused to vote tor the expnng:1.ng resolution when directed 
to do so b;r the Virginia General Assembly. Instead he resigned his seat 
rather than participate in mat he considered an unoonsti tutional tri~ph 
of the President over the Senate) 
The anti-Jackson. opposition in Congress am in the country asswned 
the nicknme .. lf\tbig• in symbolic detlanoe at what they called the monarob.1 ... 
al despotism of Jackson. In opposing executive deminanoe over Congress, 
the tings prided themselves in pt'eaohing the dogma that they were true 
disciples o.t Jettersonian Republ.icard.81110 Inconsistent as it ma;r seem, no 
ildgs were more emphatic than the old National Repiblicans in championing 
2u.s., Register .!f. Debates, 23rd Cong., 2nd Sess., X, Pa.rt 1, Po 60. 
34r<>n Gardiner fyler, lh!. Letters eg, 'l'imes of lb!, 'lylers . (3 vols., 
Ri.ehmond: Whittet and Shepperson, 1885), I, p. 530, cited hereinafter as 
Tyler, ·Letters !!!!. Times. One of the best discussions of the earl;r de... 
velopment or the Presidency is in Wllf'recl F;o Binkley, Pre1Jident and 
Congress (New YorkJ A~Ao Knopf', 1947), Chapso II-IV. -
3 
Con~essional supremacy. 'Ihe deep divisions between the Whigs and the 
Jacksonian Democrats ove:r the Presidency did not oocur in a vacuum. The 
great domestic issues of' the day -- the question of protective taritts, 
internal improvements, the banking and monetary system, an:t the disposal 
ot piblio lands -- furnished 1'1el. for the constitutional debates over the 
shift of power from Congress to the President. But on these issues the 
\.td.gs were themselves divided. 'Ibey needed only to elect their first 
' 4 President in order to prove the looseness of their party ties. 
The formation of the \ohig Party was one of the most important events 
in the career of Tyler, for to it he owed his elevation to the Presidency. 
Am yet his ndm was in all probability disturbed with strong misgivings 
when he joined hands with the National Repiblicans of the North. ll'or not 
only did he abhor the principles advocated by them, but he also dis-
trusted some of their outstanding leaders. ot these leaders, Daniel 
Webster was particularly offensive to him. Webster's nomination for the 
Presidency by the Whigs, he thought, would be a great blun:ter, tor it 
would revive the tariff an:! the question of slavery in the Dlstrict ot 
Columbia.5 
'Ihe coalition of groups and men known as the \ohig Party first tried 
out its national strength in the Presidential campaign ot 18)6. With so 
man;y diverse ele•nts, agreement as to a plattol'lll or even a candidate was 
not possible and so no national convention was held. 'lhe strongest faction 
in the coalition was the National Republican element, and in the main it 
endorsed William Henry Harrison. In Massachusetts, however, the National 
41!.ber Malcolm Carroll, Origins gt_ the Whig Party (Ann Arbors Univer-
sity of Michigan Press, 1922), PP• 122-fin'. 
5Tyler to w.r. Gordon, November 9, 1834, in Tyler, Letters !!!!! I!!!!!_, 
I, P• 293. 
4 
Replblicans supported Webster, and he received the vote of that stateo 
'!he states• rights vbigs or the South, emept the nullifiers of 
South Carolina, nppol"ted as their candidate Judge Hugh L. thite of 
Tennessee, who was "a striet oonstructionist or the pnrest typeo .,6 Tyler 
was the favored ca~date in the South for the Vice-Presidency, thongh 
little interest was taken in this phase of the campaigno Of all the en-
dorsements received, the one given Tyler by the Old Dominion was doubt.. 
less the most grati:tyingo White and Tyler ma.de good rv.nning mates, for 
the latter had oome out for the former as early as May, 18350? The 
mulif'iers of South Carolina, the West and most of the Northern Whigs 
8 favored a ticket of Harrison and Tyler., 
The Demoorats in 18'.36 nominated Martin Van 1:nren for the Presidency 
am Colonel Richard M. Johnson for the Vice-Presidency., The Whigs did 
not expect that any one of their candidates would receive a majority in 
the Electoral College, mt they- hoped that enough votes would be drawn 
from .van Buren to prevent his receiving a majority. Tb,e election would 
f I 
then be thrown into the House, where a. Whig Dlight have a chance to be 
chosen. 
Van :&lren was ele~ted President. Bat Tyler received rorty ... seven 
electoral votes, having carried the states at Maryland, South Carolina, 
Tenne·ssee, and Georgiao He was thus third in the race for the Office of 
Vice-President. Johnson received a plura1ity but not a majority of' the 
electoral voteso '!he Senate was, therefore, called upon to make a choice 
61.rthur Charles Cole, !, Whig ,~ !!!, :!i!!_ South (Washingtons American 
Historical Association, 1913), PP• l :,. 
?w. Cramp to Tyler, Febnary 14, 18'.36, in Tyler9 Letters !!.4 Tim.es, 
I, Po .5170 
8Ibido, Po 5200 
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between Johnson and Francis Granger, his closest oompetitoro Johnson was 
chosen on the first balloto9 
The \tu.gs saw 1840 as a banner yearo '!he Van Buren administration 
had failed miserably to solve the nation's eoonomic problems and could 
O(IJJ.e up with nothing more inspiring than the Independent Treasury pl.an to 
counter the economic erisiso The Whigs had made sharp gains in the South 
in the elections ot 18380 In the North consel"Vative Democrats, convinced 
that the DemoOl"aey had been captured by a radical element, were willing 
to cooperate with the Whigs on most matters or tisoa1 and economic polieyo 
'!he Van Buren administration did little to earn the alliance of the un.m 
employed workingmen, and it certainly had no solution to the problemo 
Indeed, Van Ba.ren, in his annual message of December, 1837, criticized 
those who were "prone to expect too mch from Governmentottl.O Nor did the 
\idgs of 1840 have any idea how to produce "two dollars a day and roast 
beet• eith.ero But they were out and Van Buren was in, am the slogan was 
oogentoll 
·A long fight in the Virginia legislature in 1839 and 1840 aroused a 
bittemess of feeling toward Tyler which weakened his hold on the Whig 
Party in the Old Dominiono The Virginia \id.gs denied him the privilege 
of repr>esenting them at the convention held at Harrisburg in December, 
9 7homas Hart Benton, 'lbirt;y; Years View (2 volso, New York: Do Applern 
ton atd Coo, 1858), I, Po 6830 ---- . 
lO James D. Richardson, ed. , lJl!. Messages !!!t l!e!£!. !( ne Presid.ents 
(20 vol.so, New York: Bureau of National Literature, 1904), I , p .. 390, 
cited hereinafter as Richardson, edo, !9ssages !!!!. Pa.perso 
ll ( Arthnr Mo Schlesinger, Jro, ll!!, M!, !!, Jwscm Bosto:ru Little 
Brown a:rid Coo, 1945), pp~ 217-2260 '!he slogantt:y• s policy: fitty-
cents a day and French soup.,... Ottr policy: Two dollars a day am roast 
beef" ,,.s a \'\big campaign slogan or unemployed Northern workingmen in 
1838 and 181400 
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1839012 This national convention, however, honored him by conferring upon 
him one of ~he thirteen permanent vice-presidenciesol3 The convention 
adopted a plan whereby a gererai committee, composed of representatives _ 
from each state delegation, ohose the candidate for President and Vice-
President. After the general committee had made a selection, it was rati: 
fied by the co.nventi~n as a ,wholeol4 
. .. 
The genera+ conmd ttee entered upon its work w1 th a deep sense of the 
important task at hand, for they knew that victory or defeat for the 
' . 
Whigs at the polls depended upon their standard bearero The leading 
candidates, Henry Clay, Winfield Scott, and William Henry Harrison 9 were 
represented on the committeeo Clay9 perhaps the ablest of the three, had. 
taken such a positive stand on some public questions about which v.higs 
were in mar~~d disa~eement ~at it would be ditficult to rally the di-
verse elements behind himo Strange as it may seem9 a majorit~ of Southern 
delegates supported Clay.despite his record in support of a nationalistic 
policy. They regarded him as the "Great Pacificator" since his champion... 
ship of the Compromise Tariff of 1833015 For this and other reasons 
.. , 
Tyler, Hugh Lo White, Henry Ao Wise and James Barbour, all Virginians, 
felt justified in supporting him for the Presidency in 18400 Unfortunate ... 
I 
ly for Clay, there were in line tw., military heroes= General Scott and ,, 
General Harrisono Both were of the WAr of 1812 fame 9 am Harrison had 
wen the sobriquet or "Tippecanoe" by having led in a battle w1 th the 
Indians at a place by that nameo Scott's public career had been confined 
12Henry Alexander Wise, Seven Decades of the Union (Hdladelphia: 
J oB. Lippincett and Coo, 18'n.), ppo 157-;J.61-;-oite'd hereinafter as Wise, 
Seven Decadeso 
l3Ch1twood, ~ TJ:ler, Po 1640 
14Ib1.do, Po 1650 
15Tyler, Letters ~ Times, II, Po 3340 
7 
to military' affairs and Harrisonts record as a Congressman and territorial 
govemor had been an inconspicuous one. Clay would have won the nomination 
had 1 t not been tor Thurlow Weed of New York, who felt that Clay- could not 
carry New York and Permsy-lvania at the pollso Weed at first supported 
Soott, but.finally- threw the entire New York delegation to Harrison, who 
received the nom:inationo 
'!he general oamnittee met again to select a ra.nning mate tor General 
Harrisono The first vote oast tor Tyler was that of HoWo HUliard, a 
delegate from Alabama.o On every- ballot from the beginning he voted for 
Clay and 'l'y'lero Hilliard bad made the .journey- from Washington to Harris ... 
burg in Oonsp&ny' 1d. th Tyler, and hi.s steady- support was probably- due to 
the good impression made on the young Alabaman by- the pleasing person.. 
ality- or the Virginia statesmanol6 It had been unanimously- agreed that 
in the event Clay- were selected to head the ticket, a Vice ... Presidential 
candidate f'rC!llll a tree .state would be selected; whereas, if Scott or 
Harrison were selected, the second place would go to a candidate tro;m a 
slave-holding stateo In the latter event, Tyler would be the logical man 
since he was a strong states' -rights man and his support of Clay would 
infiuence Clay- supporterso His nomination would be a recognition of the 
Southern element and a peace offering. The Massa.ohu.setts delegationi 
after some vacillating between Tyler and Benjamin Wo Isigh of Virginia, 
nominated fyler and other delegations, except that of Virginia, which ab-
stained from voting, changed their vote to Tylero Thus Tyler was chosen 
with the vote of every delegation except that of his home state or 
Virginiao Tyler was very muoh in disfavor with the Virginia Whigs at this 
16HoWo Hilliard, Fblitios and Pen Pictures at Home and Abroad (New 
Yorka GoP .. i:tttnam.•s Sons, l882);J;oT, cited hereinafieras Hilliard, 
Poli tics !!!!; J!!!!. PJ.ctllreso 
8 
time. John Minor Botts afterwards said that at the time of his nomi ... 
nation Tyler could not have been elected in Virginia to the lowest county 
offlceol7 
In the election campaign of 1840 the Whigs avoided discussion of the 
domestic issues o.r the day, but devoted their energies to damning twelve 
years of executive usurpation under Jackson and Van Btlren. Over= 
shadowing aey serious discussion was the nonsense and humbuggery of the 
"log cabin and hard ci.d.er" campaigno "Tippecanoe and Tyler, too!" 
shouted conservative \tlig statesmen f'rom the factories of New England to 
the sugar plantations of Louisianao It was a great slogano "There was . ' 
rhyme but no reason in it," s~id Phillip Hone.18 Hone 0 s remark sums up 
the history of the Whig "Log Cabin and Hard Cider" campaign of 18400 
Never before in the United States, and seldom since, has a major politi-
cal party taken such cynical advantage of the political naivette of the 
popu].ationo 
The Whig strategy was to keep Harrison vague and Tyler quiet while 
party managers whipped up enthusiasm for their candidates in a oum:n1= 
like atmosphere of torchlight parades, slogans, catchy campaign songs, and 
semia,drllnken campaign rallieso Keeping Harrison vague was no problem at 
allo Vague on the bank, fuzzy on slavery, contradictory on the tariff am 
on internal improvements, Harrison said he favored "sound Democratic 
Doctrines, upon which the administrations of Jefferson and Madison were 
l7mes' National .Register, LXI, P• 79. 
18man Nevins, ed., ll!.! Diaq !!. Phillip !!!!!!!. (New York: Dodd, Mead 
and Coo, 1936), P• .55'.3, cited hereinafter as Nevins, ed., Phillip Honeo 
Hone, a New York politician and frierd of Clay, failed to receive an ap., 
pointive office from Tyler. This probably influemed his opinion of 
Tyler., 
9 
conquoted," whatever that meantol' He condemned the executive veto power, 
promised that as President he would init4ate no legislation, declared that 
he would serve one term only, and maintained that corl"\lption in government 
was reaUy a very bad thingo Keeping Tyler silent was not much more c!itf'i .. 
cult than keeping Harrison vague. '.Ihe carnival approach se embarrassed 
Tyler that he made an honorable effort to detach himself from ito He 
preferred not to campaign, made only one speaking tou.r, and turned down 
maey invitations to speak~ When the Pittsburgh Democrats asked him point,.., 
blank whether he could sa.mtion the incorporation or a .third United states 
bank, he answered that he ha.d always thought the bank was unconstitutional 
am that he could n<,>t sanction one without a eonstitut.ional amendment per,,. 
mitting it.20 'lhis reply was sent to Wise before it was released am \itdg 
members of Congress decided that it -would be impolitic to publish ito So 
conf'u.sed were the Whigs on the bank issue or 1840 that when the question 
came up again in 1841 they could not decide aether it had been an 
election issue, or if' it had been, just 'Where the Whig Party had taken 
its stando2l 
'.Ihe Democratic c$Mpaign, led by Van Bllren and Johnson, never got off 
the gN>undo '!he Democracy was constantly on the defensive in 18400 Still 
consorting openly with his mulatto par811'1our, Johnson did not stir many 
souls in the SOlllthern Democracyo Democrats were no match for vadg f'ight 
songs and carnival-like campaign taoticso '!hey were utterly frustrated 
in their etf'orts to point out the raot that Whiggery was a more conf'used 
1~eman Cleaves' .Qls!. Ti~anoe: William Henn Hamson ·~ !!!!. 
Times (New Yor}c: Charles-Scribners Sons, 1939), PPo 312.,..)13, cited here-
inafter as Cl.eaves, ms!, T.lppeoOlOeo 
201y1er, Letters !!!.Si. Times, I, Po 620 o 
21.Ibid., II, po 5210 
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state of ~~ than a pol_itica;t party... '!here were many ifJsues, bnt neither 
party took a . definite stand on anythingo22 
Wb~n the balJ.ots were counted, Van ~en was a defeated mano He 
carried only seven of' the twenty-six states. In popolar votes, h.owev:er, 
he trailed Harrison by only 150,000 of the 2,400,000 casto He polled 
more votes in defeat than he polled in victory in 18360 Ironically, 
Harrison and Tyler, both born in Charles City County, Virginia, failed to 
carry their native stateo Van &lren also lost his native New Yorko23 
On a cold, brisk Inauguration Day some f'itty thousand excited and 
cheleJ"ing citizens jammed the frozen streets as the venerable General rode 
"Old Wlitey" up Pennsylvania Aveim.e to the Capitolo24 Bat in hand, with-
out overcoat or gloves, the Old Hero of Tippecanoe waveti and bowed te the 
crowdo As the attention of' the throng f'oased on the General0 s tr>iumphal 
progress to Capitol Hill, Tyler made his unnoticed way quietly from 
Brom0 s Hotel to the Senate chamberso There, shortly after the noon 
hour, he was swrn in as Vice-President ot the United Stateso His speech 
lasted barely five minutes. It was a standard Tyler appeal f'or states 11 
right.so Uninspired and largely unheard, it was not one of the al"ticulate 
Virginian°s better perf'orma.meso25 
1.lle Vioe-President8 s speech was followed by a short pause, after 
22Robert Gray Gllnd_erson k Lol Cabin Campaign (Lexington: Univer"" 
sity of' Kentucky Press, 1957), PPo 7 63. · 
23&igene Ho Roseboom,. ! Histol"Y ,!! Presidential E:l.eotions (New Yorka 
The Macmillan Coo, 1957), P• 122. 
24The weather on March 4, 1841, has been reported diff'erentJ.y by 
various historians, but most scholars attribute Barnson•s pneumonia: to 
his exposure ~ the weather on inauguration dayo- Chitwood, ~ '1);1er, 
Po 200; Cleaves, ,S!.s! Tippecanoe, po 336; Gnnderson, ll!.!. Log Cabin 
Campaign, Po 226. . ' . 
25Benten, Thirty Years View, II, Po 209. 
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which Genera1 Harrison entered and was conducted to the seat prepared for 
bimo A procession was fomed which escorted the President-elect to the 
eastern portico of the Capitolo Here he delivered his .inaugura1 address 
and took the oath of ottioe as President o:f' the United stateso After the 
inaugural ceremonies were ov:er, the Senate reassembled with Vice-President 
Tyler in the chair. Nominations :f'or cabinet positions were received :f'rom 
President Harrison and all were unanimously oontirmedo 26 
'lhu.s Harrison, aged and frail, was swept into of':f'ioe with the 
Virginia states0 rights le.big, 'lyler, who wu safely embalmed in the . Vice-
Presidenoy where his peculiar anti-nationalistic ideas oould not be ex... 
pected to cause troubl.eo In his Inaugura1 Address, Harrison echoed 
cardinal Whig principles, including thiss "it is preposterous to suppose 
that o o o the President o ... could better understand the wishes 0 0 0 
of the people than their OWl'l immediate representativeso"27 
26Ibido 
27R:1chardson, ed., Messages !,!g, Papers, IV, p .. lOo 
CHAPrER II 
i• I 
A PRESIDENT BY ACCIDENT 
Dlring the campaign the Whig newspapers had a great deal to say 
about General Harrison's good health and robust constitution. His poweu. 
ot endurance were doubtless overestimated and were probably not equal to 
the demands made on his vitality by .the new responsibilities. His 
routine of living was disturbed by social dissipation and his peace ot 
mind upset by the importunities of hungry office seekers. ~en he was 
attacked by pneumonia on March 24 he was unable to pat up efteotive re-
sistance to the disease and succumbed to it on April 4, only one month 
after his succession.1 In the delirium of his last hours he addressed 
his physician, whom he probably took for his successor, in these wordsa 
•sir, I wish you to unC,erstand the true principles ot the Government. I 
wish them carried out. I ask nothing more.•2 
'lhus Tyler became the first Vice-President of the United States to 
succeed to the Presidency in order to complete the unexpired term ot the 
President. Harrison's death created something of a constitntional crisi, 
in its time even though the issue it raised intlames few tempers today. 
For much ot the time prior to 1841 the Vice-Presidency had been a com-
fortable way in which to honor sonae of the countr:,•s more able poliUc~. 
Buch was the case with T.,ler. So obsaur~ did the ott'ice beoom. after 
1Ch1 twood, ~ .M£.,· p. 201. 
2Tyler to Clay, April 30, 1841, in '1'7191', Let\fr• .!!!!. lH!!!,, II, P• )2. 
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ratif'ioation of' the Twelfth Amendment, that under the Virginia dynasty 
the Secretary of State was in virtua~ ~uoce~sion to the Presidencyo ·The 
elder Adams. is said to have chafed in the office, Jefferson supposedly 
considered it an innocuous post, and Calhoun was described as scheming 
his intrigue while presiding over the Senate w1 th dignity and poiseo 3 
Even the venerated framers were at a loss to discuss the office with their 
usual eloquenceo As one of the signers observed, •such an office as Vice-
, 
President was not wantedo He was introduced merely for the sake of a 
valuable mode of' election, which required. two to be chosen at the same 
timeo ..4 
Vice.-Pres:ident .Tyler, who was at his home in Virginia, had known that 
the President was illo Congress was not in sessiono The tact that int... 
mediate c,oll'IIIIUnication could not be had with the Vice-President made the 
situation as embarrassing as it was sado The office of the Chief= 
Executive of the United States wa,s vacant, and in unusual circumstances, 
according to the Constituti.on, someone must ad!llinister the functions of 
that office without delay. The circumstances at hand warranted hasteo 
.Realizing the urgency of the situation, Secretary of State Webster was 
equal ·to the occasion, and he hastily called a meeting of .the cabinet to 
discuss the problemo A decis.ion was soon ~eached that an official notifi,., 
cation to the nation concerning the death of the President should be 
drafted and published, and a message immediately dispatched to the Vice-
P.residfnto In this manner the people of t~e United States were notified 
3~rd Samu~ Corwin, Ih!, Presidential Office and Powers, 1787~ 
(New York: New York University Press, 1957), PPo '73,"1io8, cited herein-
after as Col"Win, Presidential Office; Margaret Coit, _John .Q.o Calhoun, 
American J>ortl"ait {Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 19.50), p:-IbOo 
4Kax Farrand, _Records of the Federal Convention (3 vc,lso P New Haven: 
Yale University Pressp .1910), II, Po .5)7. · 
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of Harrison's death and Fl.etcher Webster, Chief Clerk of the State De-
partment and .Secretary of State Webster's son, hurried off to notify the 
Vice-President. 
Tyler was at his home, Sherwood Forest, in Wllliamsburg, Virginia, 
when young Webster delivered the news of Harrison's death in a message 
signed by the members of the cabinet and addressed to "John Tyler, Vice-
President or the United States."5 Nathan Sargent, one of the Wu.g 
chroniclers of the period claimed that the cabinet discussed the proper 
address to Tyler and concluded that "Mr. Tyler mst, while performing 
the functions of President, bear the title of Vie9c,President, acting 
President • ..6 Such a view was in keeping with the extreme vlrl.g theory or 
a limite.d Chief-Executive -- one who wa,s not even to be independent of 
the judgment of his cabinet. Tyler hastened at once to the Capitol at 
Washington, where on April 6, 1841, he took the oath . swearing that he 
'MOuld taithf'ully execute the duties of the office of the Presidento After 
the ceremony, Judge William Cranch, who administered the oath9 issued a 
sworn statement which has always raised some questions about Tyler0 s . 
motives and intentionso Cranch said that Tyler bad appeand bet"ore him 
al'ld although the Vice-Pl-esident thought himself qualified to perform the 
duties and to exercise the powers and office of P.resident with011t an oath 
other than that which he took as Vice-President, yet, "as doubts may arise, 
and for greater caution, fiylei/ took and subscribed the o o o oath before 
me."7 
5Ri.chardson, ed., ~ssages !!!!, Papers, IV, PPo 21=22o 
6Natban Sargent, Public Men and Events (2 volso, Fh11.adelph1ai J.Bo 
Lippincott am Coo 11 1875), II, p.122, cited hereinafter as Sargent!) 
Pttblic Meno -
7 Richardson, edo, Messages !!!t Papers, IV, Po '.31o 
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Tyler's decision to take the oath, apparently &l'l"ived at after hesi ... 
tation and doubt on his part, established a constitutional usage or the 
first importance o As he said in an inaugural address issued to the 
country three days later: "This o o o occurrence has subjeoted the 
wisdom and sufficiency of our institutions to a new testo For the first 
time in our history the person eleoted to the Vice-Presidency of the 
United States o o o has had devolved upon him the Presidential officeo..S 
More than mere niceties of language were involved in this mattero 
There were several questionso Does the Vice-President merely act as 
President upon the death of the President, or does the Vice ... President 
vacate the office to 'Which he was elected and become the President 1 Had 
Tyler decided he was the Vice-President acting as President, undoubtedly 
the oath he had already taken as Vice-President was sufficiento On the 
other hand, once he decided to become President, it would appear from a 
reading of the Constitution that he should legally subscribe to the oath 
provided especially for the President. The Constitution provides that 
"Before he enter on the execution of his office, he shall take the 
following Oath or Af!irmationo"9 The act of taking the oath marks the 
President's first off;ioial duty in officeolO The doubts that may arise, 
as Judge Cranch said, would have been well found,ed if Tyler laid claim to 
the Presidential office without ever taking the oath., The greater caution 
appears to have been the mark of prudence and neoessityo 
As Harrison was the first ~sident to die in o:f:t'ice, there was no 
precedent to indicate whether the Vice...President should be accorded all 
8 Ibido, Po 37 o 
9u.s., Constitution o:f the United States, Arto II, Seco lo 
. -----
lOCorwin, Preside.ntial Office, po ?2o 
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the power and dignity of a regular Chief ... Eicecut.ive or be regarded onl.y as 
an acting Chief-Eicecutiveo Tlte Constitution provides that "In case of 
Removal of the President from Office, or ot his death o o o or Inability 
to discharge the Powers and nit1es of the said office, the same shall de... 
volve on the Vice,..Presidento .,ll Whether "the same" refers to the office 
or th.e duties is not clear from the text of the Constitutiono Tyler, how-
ever, interpreted it to refer to the office and at once claimed al.l the 
rights and privileges of the Presidenoyo The precedent set by him has 
been followed in every subsequent case in lilich a Vice-President has sue ... 
ceeded to the office of' Presidento 
Tyler0 s interpretation of this clause in the Constitution was not ac= 
cepted by all of the leaders, of the Whigs or the Democratso Prominent 
among the Whigs who regarded him as only Acting President was ~President 
John Qtiincy A.damso12 Some of the newspapers ~so took the same positiono 
However, the National. Intel.lifFencer, the leading lthig paper of Washington, 
argued against the attempt to deprive the incumbent or any- of the powers 
and privileges of the Preside!llCyol'.3 
When Congress met in special session on May '.31, 1841, the question 
I 
was raised in the House of Representatives by; John McK-eon or New York as 
to whether Tyler was entitJ.ed to the appellation "President of the United 
Stateso" A resolu.tion recognizing him as President had already been of ... 
fered by Wise of Virginiao 'l'yler would claim, said he, that "he was by 
lluos., Constitution, Arto II, Seco lo 
12charles Francis A.dams, ed o , Memoirs of ~ .. Quincy Adams (12 . vols o , 
Philadelphias JoBo Lippincott and Coo, 1876), X, po 463, cited herein.. 
after as Adams, edo' . Memoirso 
1'.3National. Intelligencer, April 15, 1841, in Hiles 0 National Register, 
LX, po 980 
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the Constitution, by election and by act of God, President of the United 
Stateso" Wise's resolution was passed without a divisionol4 The question 
of Tyler's position and title was raised in the Senate on June 1, 18410 
Robert Jo Walker, a Democrat from Mississippi, ably contended that the 
office of President had devolved upon the former Vice-President and not 
merely the duties of the officeo His speech was in opposition to a 
speech made the same day by Wll.:J.;1.am Allen of Ohioo Allen°s measure pl'O= 
vided that the Senate in its co111J11Unication to the Chief' Executive address 
him as "the Viee..,,President, on whem, by the death or the late President, 
the powers and duties of the office of President have devolvedo" This 
resolution was defeated by a vote of 8 yeas and 38 naysol5 
The oonsti tutional significance of Tylerq s decision to take the 
Presidential . oath seems to lie not so much in the legal realm as it does 
in the political. aspects of the off'iceo I\ wou1d be difficult to see 
how there could be any important legal dif'f'ereme_between the power>s of 
a Vice-President who had become President and one merely exercising the 
powers and duties of the office, if such a distinction is possibleo 
Tyler0 s whole course or conduct in the first few days atte:r> he ar.t>ived 
. I . 
in the capital demonstrated plainly that he. acted with conscious de"' 
liberation to establish hilllsel.r as President in his own right and notas . ' . 
a mere caretaker for the departed Harriso110 There is ample evideme t o 
su.pport the conclusion that he was aware of his unique position in histery 
and that he anticipated a determined ef'f~t from within. tu.s own party to 
minim:ize the moral and political infiuenoe whic_h made the American 
Presidency a remarkable institution f<>r leadershipo Tyler knew that if 
14uosOj Congressional globe, 27th Congo, 1st sesao, ppo 3=4o 
15Ibido, Po ,5o 
he viewed his own administration as a mere regency he could not toll.ow 
the independent course or action he had determined upono He would be 
committed to Harrison's course of action, whatever that might beo16 
18 
T;yler•s deoisio~ to assume both the dignity aid powers of the Presi-
dentia1 office apparently stirred. a considerable amount or discussion in 
the press, in fact, so much so that the edit~r or H1.les 0 Register spoke 
up in protest: 
May not the good people of this .republic be spared from 
an idle controversy in regard to the appellation by wh;ioh the 
person now at the head of its executive ,department shall be 
designated 1 The Richmond Enquirer took o.ccasion conspicuously 
to style Mro Ty-l'er as the 9act:1ng presidento 0 The National 
Intellig.emer insists that the Vice-President o o o. sa.cceeds 
to the appellation of, as well as the power am duties of 
'President• of the United Stateso The New York Post takes 
't:}le part .with the Enguirero17 -
The Pennsylvanian sided with the view that T;yler would act as President, 
and has~ned to assure its . readers that no specia1 election would take 
place, since tlrls would occlU" only if' both the .President and Vioe= 
President had vacated their offices o It added the view that T;yler should 
take the Presidential oath since !this constitu¥ the inauguration of the 
Presidento He then could ~communicate to his fellow citizens, by an 
address, the principles upon liihich he intends to administer the govern» 
mento"~a 
Ex,.,Presi~ent Adams did not permit party loyalty to obscure his 
judgment of the ma.ttero He ne>ted in his diary on April 4tJ 1841 11 antic1= 
pating the later discussion of the problem, that "this event o o o makes 
16Ty-ler to WUliam Co Rives, April 99 1841, in Ty'ler11 Letters !D!, 
Times, Ilp Po 200 . 
17Nlles.• National Register, LX, po ll'.3o 
18Ibido, Po 880 
the Vice-President ••• John Tyler ••• Acting President ot the Union 
for four years less one month • ..19 He add~d his unflattering personal 
judgment of Tyler as a man and as a statesman, a judgment which colored 
all his relations with the President tor the remainder of their lives. 
19 
Tyler, said Adams, was a "political sectarian" who was "principled against 
improvement," wit~ talents "not above mediocrity."20 On April 16, after 
public discussion of the problem had commenced, he confided to his diarys 
"I paid a visit this moming to Mr. Tyler, who styles himself President 
••• and not Vice-President acting as President ••• He moved into the 
house f:'thi te Housi/ two days ago. "21 
Before Tyler's succession to the !Tesidency becall18 a closed public 
matter through Congressional confirmation, there occurred two events 
which strengthened the new President's viewpoint respecting the succession. 
As Adams indicated, the President moved into the vadte House on April 14, 
1841. 'lbe White House, of course, is the residence of the President, al-
though it coul~ be the residence of an acting !Tesident. A scrupulously 
correct strict constructionist might, as Adams suggested, be reluctant to 
take such a step. In fact, a conscious unwillingness to take this step 
might well symbolize the position of a Vice-President who took the view 
that he had not become the President. 
On April 24, 1841, the President met the diplomatic corps in the 
\ante House, where Alexander de Bodisco, the Russian minister, made a 
brief' speech in which he said: "Mr. President. · •• the Constitution has 
19 Adams, ed., Memoirs, X, p. 456. 
20 Ibid., PP• 456-457. 
21 Ibid., PP• 463-464. 
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invested you with the chief 111.agistracy of the Uniono"22 The President0 s 
reply accepted this view and :further expressed a hope for continued 
peaceful relations between this nation and the others ot the world .. Al. ... 
though it could be argued tha~ the members of the dil.)lomatic coI"ps would 
have been unwise bad they add.re~;sed the head of this na~ion in any c;,ther 
fashion, it still remains a fact that this act marked a f'u?>ther acceptance 
of the newly established usageo 
Arr:, present disCU6sion of this ~icular succession problem seems 
to have been muted by usage, but the issue was clearly alive .in April 11 
1841 o Tyler was faced with a constitutional. crisis of sorts which he had 
to resolve according to his own conscienoeo loldl.e he has been adversely 
criticized for his caution and dou.bts in making his decision, the faet of 
the ~ tter is that he showd good judgment and courage in reaching his 
deoisiono He determined for the future the mle that .an "accidental" 
I ' . > 
President shill possess every vestige of power, right and influence ena, 
joyed by one elected to the off'iceo23 The truth of the matter appears to 
be that the Conati tution contains so many provisions on the subject which 
are either ambiguous or conflicting that the problem had to be decided 
within the spirit bat outside the letter of the instl'Wl1ento The Con.. 
stitution, as T;rler J1111st have realized, spoke no clear and unequivocal 
commando '!he inBtitutional test caused by Hamson° s death was a new one 
calculated to try the jud~ent or meno 
The succession issue appears to have been closed with the vote of 
Congress so that even Adams referred to T;rler as "the President" in his 
22 Niles' National .Register, LI, po 1300 . . 
23Herbert Wo Horwill, Ill!. Usages ~ the American Constitution 
(London: OJcford University ·Press, 1925J, po 590 
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Memoirs of June 25, 1841024 So deep, however, were the wounds later in,. 
fiicted by Tyler on his political adversaries that their response was 
venomous o Tyler had beoane a President by choice and by his actions set 
a precedent which is followed to this day in like Qircum.stances'! 
On April 9, 1841, President Tyler issued a statement to the American 
people m _ich might be termed his Inaugural Addresso It was of moderate 
length and rather indefinite in meam.ngo Th.e language used was ra~er 
commonplace, and the style was not up to the stand_ard of' the best of_ his 
speeches in Congresso His position, however, was clearly defined on a 
f'ew questions.. Be reviewed the unusual events which surrm,mded his SUC= 
cession to the highest office in the, country, and promised to place in 
.-
the patriotism of' the people his safe and abiding relianceo The Presi ... 
dent beheld the storm clouds rising, tor he made reference to the fact 
that the spirit of faction was opposed to the spirit of patriotism and 
that in such opposition an ~casion might be roum to attack his ad ... 
ministrationo ·Political rivalry, which was nel"V"ously maneuvering for 
' . . 
position, was at large in the land, and it was of no use for the Presi ... 
dent to try to avoid a cont~cto 
The of'tice holders who were under federal appointment bad a great 
deal of uneasiness for tear of being removed by President Hal"f'ison°s 
successor, but such fears were allayed when Tyler promised that no one 
would lose his posit.ion as long as he was honest and faithful in the ad= 
ministration of official dutieso He favored strengthening the &l'fflY' and 
navy and the adoption of such measures as would render both "replete with 
efficienc,yo n25 
24Adams, ed .. , Memoirs, X, Po 4860 
25Richardson, edo 9 Messages ,!$. Papers, IV, ppo 3E>m39o 
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·Tyler told the nation that the ''usual opportunity which is afforded 
to ·a Chief J,1.a.gistrate" to -present the 'DOl~oy ldlich will "guide his ao-
Ministration, in the fom of an inaugural address" had been denied hi1'l 
and, therefore, "a brief exposition of the principles which will govern" 
him w~d --seem to be due the people. 26 This step alone should have been 
a clear warning to the Whigs that Tyler did not intend to be a compliant 
servant or the party masters. Had Tyler intended merely to stand in the 
shadow of Harrison, it would have been inappropriate for him to addres s 
the nation with a statement of his own principles. Consciously and boldly 
Tyler unf"urled his sail before the political winds that were soon to blow 
with hurricane force. 
~nny aspects of Tyler's inaugural address stood in direct contrast 
to Harrison's infiated address, often said to have been prepared with the 
approval o.f Clay and Webster. 27 Harrison admitted that dispites had oc-
casionally arisen over the amount of power constitutionally granted to 
Congress, but he consoled his listeners with the assuranoe that "most or 
the instances of alleged departure from the letter or spirit of the Con-
sti tution have ultimately received sanction of . a majority of t he people. 1128 
With this obvious reference to the constitutio,nality of the BanJc of the 
United States, he further averred that the real source or danger to the 
nation's liberties was the growth of executive power. He added his view 
26Ibid., P• '.37. 
27Dorothy B. Goebel, WUliam ~ Harrison (Indiana"P()lis a Historical 
81reau of Irdiana Library an:! Historical Department, 1926), p. 227; Robert 
J. lbrgan, ! Whig &nbattl.ed, the Presidenof !!!!!£ ~ Tyler (Lincolns Uni-
versity of Nebraska Press~ 19m, p. 18, cted hereinafter as Morgan, v.hig. 
&nbattl.ed. For Harrison's Inaugural Address, see Richardson, ed., Messages 
.!w! Papers, IV, PP• 5-21. 
28Ibid. , p. 7. 
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that the veto power, _a seemin~ incon~ruity in our syRte~, ought to be 
used only with the groatest forbearance. Modestly Harrison mortg~ged 
his future by stating that he would set a proper example in declining a 
second teM. 
Tyler had no taste for such principles. After declaring a spirit of 
friendliness toward all nations, he comforted the t-adgs by decrying the 
"union of p.1rse and sword" in the hands of the President. 29 He took the 
vow ot poverty where public spending was concerned. Moving closer to the 
·, 
hoart of t-adg dogma, he declared that "if any war has existed .between the 
Govemment arxl the currency, it shall cease. Measures or a financial 
character now having the sanction or legal enactment shall be taitbtully 
enforced until repealed by the legislative authorities. n30 He then m.,.de 
a somewhat enigmatic statement which cheered the Clay Whigs until it was 
later elaborated with his vetoes, and drove the advocates or rechartering 
the Bank or the United States into a frenzy or frustration. Tyler said g 
I shall promptly give my sanction to any constitutional 
measures which originating in Congress, shall have for its 
objective the restoration of a sound circulating medium •••• 
In deciding upon the adaption of an.y measure to the end pro-
posed, as well as its conformity to the Constitution, I shall 
resort to the fathers of the great repiblican school for ad-
vice and instruction, to be drawn from their sage views or 
. our system or government. 31 · 
Yet given the views or such repiblican fathers as Jefferson and Madison 
toward the. Bank, the old National Republicans saw in this passage as-
surance that' Tyler would not oppose their drive to recharter the Bank. 
In contrast to Harrison's nationalist carel~ssness with constitutional 
29Ib1d • t P• 37 • 
30Ibid., P• 39. 
31Ib1d. 
princtples, Tyler added his long-standing view thats 
l'}lose who are charged with its L'the lPederal Government0i]' 
achd.nistration should 'caref'ully abstain from all attempts to 
enlarge the range of 1 ts powers thus granted to the several 
departments of the government other ·than by an appeal to the 
people for addition,al grants, lest by so doing they distllrb 
tJl.e balame which the patriots and statesmen who t _r.811led the 
Constitution designed tq establish between the Federal govern» 
me11t and the states pomposing tlie UnionooooAn opposite course 
could not fail to generate factions intent upon the gratif'i,.., 
cation of the selfish ends, to give birth to local and sectional 
jealousies, am to ultimate either in breaking asun.ier the bonds 
ot union or in building up a central aystemwhich would in= 
evitably e:nd in a · bloody scepter and an iron crowno32 
24 
In this b:r'ief message Tyler stated his views which wre uncomfortably 
independent of those expressed by Harrison and supported by the nationalist 
leaders or the Wbig Part.Yo Harrison advooa.ted loose constl"llction of the 
' ' 
powers of Congress in obvious support of a revived Banlc, bllt Tyler warned 
against distllrbing the federal balance of powers without resorting to the 
amending processo Harrison condemned the Ja.cksonian use of the veto, but 
Tyler warned that he would give his a.pproval only to financial . measures 
acceptable~ true Jeffersonian Republicans and, by inference~ his veto 
to those llhich were not .. A'1'iy opposite course, he admonished his party 
and the oountry, 1'0Uld only result in factional and !'tectional conf'l.ictso 
Harrison decried the expansion of independent executive power!il hit Tyler 
did littJ.e :more than disapprove the union of p11rse an:1 sword and un=, 
ohecked spoilsmanshipo Harrison announced his unavaila~ty for> re= 
nomination to the Presideney-, but Tyler remained silent on this issueo 
Harrison dealaimed with the eloqueme of a trne Jeffersonian Rep11blican 
against Presidential domination of Congressp the real representatives or 
the people, bit on this issue Ty!l.er srld nothingo The polite approval 
with lihich Tyler11 s message was received by the vbigs belled the anxious 
32Ibido 
aonf'erences of ~eir leadere as they- gathered in Washington for the 
special session o~ Congress called by Harrison to meet on May 31<> 
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CHAPTm III 
THE SffX:IAL SESSION OF 1841. - THE ll'IRST BRF.AIC 
Tyler• s hastily wr1 tten inaugural address ot April 9 was both an 
olive bramh to the various Whig factions and a cautious trial balloon to 
test the . general. political atmosphere. Later, as his thoughts began to 
take substance and form, he decided to adopt a defensive posture with 
reference to any tisoal changes. He wrote that since he had no opportunity 
to talk to Harrison about the special session, the country could not ex-
' . ( 
peot a matured message f'rolll him. He would leave the tiscal probl.8JllS up 
to Congress, with the resel"'lation that he would veto any measure it such 
be necessary in his view of' the subjeot.1 He agreed that Van &ire~•s 
Independent 'h-easury should be repealed. 'lhis did not suggest to him 
that the old Bank ot the United States should necessarily be re-established 
in its stead. "As to the Bank, I design to be perfectly frank with you·," 
he told Clay, "I would not have it urged prematurely." It Clay insisted 
on pishing ahead with a new bank project, Tyler hoped he wool.d so f'rallle 
a bank as to avoid all oonstitntional objections. 'lhe Presi«;ient would 
subd t nothl.ng to Congress on thl.s subject, wt would leave Congress to 
its own action and would resel"'le his judgment by the character of the 
Jlleasure proposed. 2 That Clay could be trusted to devise a bank plan which 
avoided all constitutional objections was JllOre ·than Tyler had a right to 
l _tyler to Nathaniel B. Tucker, April 25, 1841, in Tyler, X.tters !!!! 
· 'Times~ tt, P· 32. · 
2Tyler to Clay, April .30, 1841, in ibid., m, PP• 93-94. 
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expect. The Great Compromiser was not that great and he was in no mood 
for compromise. Nor was he blind. He saw at once that Tyler was willing . ' . 
to surrender much of his executive power ,to Congress on this crucial fi-
nancial question, retaining only the negative power ot veto. 
Tyler~s excessive caution in the opening weeks of his administration, 
and his unwill~ngness to agitate the factional situation in an unpre-
cedented transition of power added up to the creation of a political 
vacuum into lilhich the ambitious Clay walked boldly. The Kentuckian was 
already convinced that Tyler's achinistration would be little more than 
a "regency," and that serious objection to the constitutionality of a 
national bank was "confined to the state of Virginia." To him the ac-
cidental President was b~t a "flash in the pan," to be neither feared nor 
followed) Clay naturally thought that Tyler, a mild mannered Virginian 
with a soft exterior, would not have the temerity to strenuously oppose 
his policies. Tyler's tactful method in dealing with his colleagues some-
times left the impression tha~ he did not have llUoh backbone. Clay was 
one of those who mistook courtesy tor weakness. He . tailed to ~erstand 
that while the President was exceptionally pleasant in his relations with 
others, he was unyielding when his convictions wre involved. He did not 
realize that a gloved hand may ~3:sily be changed ~to a clenched fist. . . . 
Tyler and Clay, despite tlle divergence of their views, were on tae 
best of terms at the begi~ .pt the administration. 'Dloma.s Ewing, one 
ot Clay's friends in the cabinet, in writi~ to the 1il1g leader, said: 
"No man can be better disposed /Jo:n.~ yoy than the President •••• Be 
speaks of you with utmost kindness and you may rely upon it his friendship 
)Clay- to N.B. Tucker, April 25, 1841, in ibid., II, P• '.30 .• 
is strong and unabatedo"4 Ci~umstances soon subjected this friendship 
·1 1 
' to a very severe straino A cionstruetive program lay ahead of them, and 
., 
a deadlo~k between their principles oould be avo.ided only' by compromiseo 
For the cl.ash that resa.l. ted, Cla;r must come in tor the chief blameo It 
he had been more e0Miliato1"3' and self""ef'facing, important meanres based 
on the principles of give and take co'IJl.d have been worked 0t1t .. :eat Clay . . . 
was arrogant and determined to have his way, and thus he let slip a great 
opporturdt:y for a~hievemento Clay0s ambition to be P.r>esident was a 
serious handicap dl?,rlng the greater part . o~ his carietero His defeat at 
Harrisburg in 1839 had not caused him tc give up ~ope er attaining t~e 
nomination in 18440 'l'he accession of Tyler injected an element of un.,, 
certainty into Clay0 s plans, for if' 'lyler ~ould make a good record and 
remain in t~e good gra,ces of the party he wold be the l C)gical e1andi.date 
in 18440 .. Su.ch a danger Cioul.d only be averted by Clay assuming leade~ 
ship of the party and discrediting 'lylero5 
Thus the politieal storm clouds hung ove:r> Washington when C@ngNss 
met in special session Ol?, May '.31, 1841, in :r'eapcnse w a e1ill issull!Jd by 
the depart@td Ba1"1"1.son.o '!'he Whigs had a ~cmf'o:r>table 1118.jority er forty.., 
,,nine in the House of Represeni.tives and a safe th011gh narrow margin @f 
seTen in th.e Senateo6 While Clay controlled the balk of the Whig vote in 
the l oW&r House 9 there W'el"e in the Senate fO'IU' ~ five sta.tes0 :rlghts 
Whigs to whom he e<mld not di~tateo He was confident that he coald 
balance the defections of this group by gU'Mring a few Demo~ratic votes 
4n,1c10, III, Po 102, noteo 
5IH.lliard 11 Pol.:itics and Pen Pictures, po ,,211~ Wlae 11 Seven DecadesS> 
po 1680 = -==- . 
6mes0 National .Register, LX, po 1950 
from the Nc)?'th and Westo As the speciial session opened 9 the Kentuold.&n 
was confident., He was Gonvinoed that he bad the pcwer and skill to unity 
the bulk ot the \tdg Party on a platform of a national bank and protective 
tari.ffo With this µnification the oreaky Whig organiu.tion would become 
stable enough to CU'J."Y him into the Wrl.te House in 184407 
Congress was promptly org~zed on the first day or the sessiono The 
next day the President9s message was received and read ~ the two bodieso 
Its style was elear and the genenl tone was pnd~nt and dignitiedo The 
message began with a compliment to Gener'~ HarTiscn by suggesting that 
Congress make some fina.ncd.al provisioins f e:,;o his family owing to the fa.ot 
that his estate had been subjected to cionsiderable expense by his removal 
to Washingtono A sensible statement was made as w what wc1llld be bis 
eioa.rse in dealing with other ~so The (!lOnciliatory but fi:mt atti'blde 
in this a.nnoumement cf foreign policy was pariirual"ly happy in view or 
the fact that the relations of the United States with both England and 
Mexico ~re tense at the timeo 
The dangerous .fi~ia1 question was net sidesteppedo He alluded te» 
the faet that the estimated revenues. tor the G'W?"r'ent year would be less 
than th~ d1sbtlrsements9 and S'li.ggested that proper measuNs be adopted f @ri 
meeting the def:'ieJito In doing this, no ~bange in the C@mJ)r6!11ise .TU'iff 
Act cf 183'.3 would be ma.de ~ept under uir>gent nwessities wbioh he did 
not beliSV'e to exist at this timeo Be lleped that a permanent system ~f 
revenue9 one imposing dis~riminating cm.ties on impwts f'~r pa.rpcses e>f' 
revenue, 'Wald be adopt.do The GNation of "a suitable fiscal agem" 
was recommended, one wbieh wul.d be •oapable of' adding increased 
facilities in the collection and disbu.rsement or public revenues." The 
establishment or a currency ·or uniform Talue depended upon such an agent .. 
The Subtreasury System ns unsatisfactory, T.,ler pointed out, and it 
was up t · Congress to devise a better pl.an. The President would be ready 
to concur w1 tJl Congress in the adoption ot any such system as it might 
propose, reserving to himself' the "ultimate power or rejection• tor any 
measure which conf'licted with the Co;nstit.ution or otherwise jeopardized 
l 
the prosperity or the country. &it be expressed hope that he would not 
have to use the veto power .. 8 
Tyler might have spared himself" the tronble of discussing a pr0a> 
posed fiscal agent tor the government, as scant attention was paid to his 
suggestions on that point by the adgs mo contl"olled both br&JJChes of 
Congress. This group looked to Clay as their leader, and he was not dis-
posed to share his leadership w1 th the President. Accordingly, he at 
once began to assert his authority in the Senate with littJ.e or no regard 
for the sensibilities or the titular head of the partyo Clay's assumption 
of party leadership was publically made when earl7 in the sessi9n he of-
fered six resolutions as a pl.an of work tor the sessiono9 'these reso.., 
lutions provided for the repeal or the Independent Treasury Act, the es= 
tablishment of a national bank, an increase in the import duties to pro= 
vide adequate revenue for the government, the distril:ution or the proceeds 
from the sale of public lands, and other measures or minor importanceo 
'lbis program was strictly in accord with the pr1nc1Jil.es or the nationalist 
wing or t.'1e Whig Party and revealed Clay's intentions to override the 
8R1.chardson, ed., Messages !!!! Pa.per~, IV, ppo ~-5lo 
9cor..gress:1cmal Cil.obe, 27th Cong., 1st sess., p .. 22; Nil.es' National 
Register, LX, p. 2380 
scruples of President Tyler whom he chose to re~nrd only as a sort of 
regentolO 
In including a national bank on the agenda of the special session 
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of Congress, Clay fully re~ized that it was unacceptable to the Presidento 
Clay was now announcing as a Whig program measures which he would not have 
dared to offer in the campaign of 1840 as a platform f'or the party. If 
the Whig leadership had talf:en such a stand, the party would in all prob-
ability have been defeated at the po1.lso 
The long friendship which,h~ existed between Clay and Tyler termi-
nated at the opening of the extra session of Congress. Not until Clay 
intimated an interest in reviving the old Bank of the United States did 
Tyler set himself to the task of devising some plan which would lead to 
conciliation and harmonyo What he devised to fill the vacuum in the ad~ 
ministration into which Clay was moving was a plan for a bank in the 
District of Columbia with power to establish branches in states request-
ing branches.. Here Tyler ma.de a tactical bl.under by coming up w1 th a plan 
after his adversary had taken the field, for had Tyler's District bank 
plan been vigorously sponsored in the first weeks of' his administration!I 
the possibilities of adoption would have been enhanced. Tyler's District 
bank would have had n9 more effect on the economy- than a new Bank of' the 
United Stateso In addition to its h.a.mlessness, it was oonsti'bltionally 
acceptable to Scm:them Whigs.11 To Clay, threatened with the loss of the 
initiative in policy making, Tyler's District bank proposal was a red 
fiago In a sto~ interrlew in the President's of'tioe, Clay made it clear 
10 
Clay to Judge 'J.uoker, April 15, 1841, in Tyler, Letters !!!L Times, 
I, po 300 
ll 
Wise to Leslie Coombs, December 29, 1842, in ibid., ll, ppo 15-170 
that the ~gs ~ould n(>t accept a bank plan so hedged with st ates 0 rights 
qualifioationso Ty-18?'0 s patieme snapped am he is reported to have said 
to Clay: "Go you now o o o to you:r> end of the Capital, and o o o perform 
your duty o o o as you shall think propero I shall do mine at tais end 
as I shall think propel"o ..12 
'!he Whigs in Congress sh.owed a willingiless to follow C'la:,-0 s leade?b 
ship, and on June 8 a bill passed the Senate providing for a ?'epeal of 
the Imep!9ment Tr>eaS'IU",Y .Aeto After having been passed b;r the House II it 
was sent to Tylel" for his app:r:iovalo l3 As the Pr>esident in. spee~hes 1n 
the campaign and in his message to Congress had expl?'essed disappr@va.l of' 
the Subtrea.mry system!) he wlllingnly signed the billo The rever sal of 
a major> polioy ot t he previc,a.s administration caused rejei,ieing am~ng the 
Whigs in Washing'tono The r>eady aoquieseen<lle (If Tyler in the fust of 
C!l.ay0 s measures did nc,t indiClate that the fome:t> had willingly abdi@ated 
party leadership to his bl"illiant rivalo It only meant thats~ far their 
views were in unisono Ccnfli@t would arise when Tyl~ was asked t @ ~ t 
his states0 rlghts seiruples aside and endorse the bank peili~y of tile 
Senate leadero 
With the support and encJcmoagement or his entirie oabinet.i Tyler sab.c, 
mitted his bank plan to Co:ngresso Pz>omptly taken u.p in the Senat e by a. 
sel~t eommittee. chaired by Clayll the a.dministrat i ~n°s Dist rict bank bill 
was quiokly mangled b&Y"n:i ~Cilcgm. tiono Tae chief f'eatun @llf' the Cl.ay 
committee0 s counterproposal.ii dated June 21 $) was that the assent of ind1= 
vidual states not be l"equired preoeding the est ablishment @f br &mh bankso 
12fyle.r to Judge Tu~kel", July 289 184ls, in ibido I) Po .54i Tyle0 s 
statement in the Madisoniu11 Aprll 23 9 18411> in i bido9 ppo 68=69o 
l3cengressional (Robel) 27th C@:ngOI) 1st S8SS011 PPo 36S) 31'.3o 
The District bank shculd be fNe tc:1 establish its bramhes whe?>e and when 
it wishedsi and this was synonymous with the naticml bankol4 
Tyler ~ould not aocsept the im,Cllluntary brane1hing feature cf Clay0 s 
revised DistrlC':lt bank concepto He lmew we, that banking legislatic,n as 
SlWh was m longer the real issue a.n;ywa.yo Tyler felt that he was on trial 
and these who had all al@ng opposed him wuld brl.ng further offensive 
meawres in i;he hopes cf learlng him impotent and powerlesso "Remember 
always that the ~wer ~laim.ed by Miro Clay and otheHsi" said Tyle?>si "'is a 
power to ereate a o~rponti@n to Gpet>ate ~ .e, ~e:tl." t he Uni~no This fNlDl 
the fi?'St has been the C¢;llntesto" 'l'yie?' remained c::i ~mrine1ed that w depart 
frcm his Distl"iot bank plan or "to pNpose a seheme en :nzy- own lmlld bei the 
height of folly si,me I have m, parly to au.stain it on independent primi= 
pleso" He therefore lcGked w his C!:i~bi.net ~o pl'@duoe a new plan ai~h 
would be oenstitutionalol5 
As Tyler began to search fer a.n ent.i:Nly different s eil 'ij,llti~n tGi the 
bank J)Nblemsi Clay dis,eoveNd that he lacked t1m VE,t.8S in the S~ta t,(11 
enact the legida:tion incerp@rat ~ his imw.unta.ry bramhing @~m8pto 
Te seoure these vGtes he <®ffered Gin Ju:r 27 a s@mewhat mil.der verisi@n ijif 
tlle DistriClt bank bill based on a CJompiromise suggested by Whig Repre<=> 
sentative ~tts c,f Virginiao Botts had been a stNng eti=bdlk man am 
still ~le.imed to be @n intimate tams with the Priesident althw.gh he had 
as ea~l:r as June 2 acCi'Used the Pt>esident @f having su~etdel?'ed himself' t @ 
"ba.ckst.airs influeMeo..1:6 He had 11 he tlAOlll.ght 9 hit upcn a f~H'ml.a wld~h . . 
14Ibido si ppo 79;,81~ ffl.les O N&timw. !§gister9 LXsi ppo 2'7 11 258=260 o 
15tyler to John Rllthe:rfor0rd (Confidenti~11 June 23si 18411> in John 
Tyler Paperssi II9 '5949 9 Division of M.anus@riptssi Libn.ey cf Ccngr>esssi 
lil.shingtonsi DoCo Cited hereinafter as Tyler Pa.per~ll Libt>il.J:'Y' • f Congres•o 
16Ril.es0 National Registe:t\1 LXIV ~ po 2150 
would serve as a basis for agreement between Clay and the Pres:idento He 
hurried to the White House and, as he maintainedi, seem.red Tyler0 s assent 
to the pla.no The President af'tel"WB.r'ds strongly denied tba t he b.ad ap:, 
proved the proposal suggested by Bcttso On the ccntraryj he had Spil?'ned 
it as "a contemptible subterfuge behind which he wuld not skdkonl7 
F.ndorsed by a Whig Congressional oaueus, the Botts eempromise oalled 
for a District ba~ whioh oould establish its branohes owly with the as= . 
sent (»f the individual stateso Bat suoh assent ~uld be pl"66Wlled aut0= 
matioally given unless the legislature of eaoh statej during its first 
' ' 
session f'ollow.tng the passage of' the bi.U.j speoifioally expNssed c~ 
position to having a District bank branch within its borderso Onoe they 
were established, however 9 the branches could be expelled by the states 
I .. 
only with the consent ofCongresso On July 28 the Senate passed the 
bill 26 to 23 and sent it to the Ho-11seo The loweri Ghsmber a:pp:r>oved t he 
measure on August 6 by a vote or 131 to 100018 
The Botts compromise went far toward meeting Tyle?>0 s states 0 rights 
cbjectionso Hindsight suggests that he should have aecepted and signed 
the measure then and tllere 8;11d b.een rid ~f the p:t>Gblemo Bat in the 
private conversation with Botts befoiN passage of the amendment 9 Tyler 
had berated the comprPDdse feature and ther>eby ~(llmlltted him.self' against 
1 
the billo Thisj it n@w seems ~learii> was a hasty and n@t~&I"afw.ly ~on= 
sidered evaluation of the &ltts p:rioposdo As it steedj the measurie was 
certainly no great threat tc sta.tes 0 l"ightso States obj~ting to the es= 
ta.blishment of Distr>icst ~nk bramhes ooul.d prevent their est&b.lishment 
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without undue ditficulty or imonvenienoe?l9 
Tyler felt the issue was mw no longer a question of ae~.e~ta.ble 
fiscal legislationi) but had become a personal power str'tlggle with Cl.a.yo 
The capital was f'i,re with spe(!lulation as to whether or not Tyler> would 
,\ . 
veto the BE>tts=Cl.ay ve:r>sion of the District bank billo Representative 
Thomas Wo Gilmer o.t Vir,ginia was oi!infident the President wow.d veto the 
billo Gilmer was eager to see the Wrl.g Party dissolve on the issue11 tor 
then there cC1_111d be a geneN.l. NG:r>gan1za:\1cn cf its dissinp.lar faeti~ns . ' . . 
along states0 rights lineso On August. 12 Rebert Tyler!) the !Tesident0 a 
seeretaryp told a New Yc:rk Ceingr,essman in the lebby ~f the Hn.se t hat 
"tc presume that m:, father can be gulled by su.tib. a hwnbcig (Cl mn:priomise as 
the bill contains is to suppose that he is an asso" The President0 s 
brothel"=in=.lawi) Judge John Bo Chl:'istian11 had "no doubt he will. vew ito• 
On the ether hand, Whig Representative AoHoBo St~rt ~f' VirginiaS> saw the 
!Tesid~nt the evening befc:r>e the vetG message was n.bmitt.ed and r .e<cl&ived 
f'Nm Tyler the impression that a "fair ground of <clOmpr>emise might yet be 
agreed upono • 'lyler> ~w the consequences of a vetco Botts wr~te him on 
August 10 that "if' you can :r>ecoMile this bi],l to ~urself 1> 8111 is stm= 
shine and cial.m: you o o o will be met with o o o a wa.rm11 hear>ty » zetl@us 
support ef o o o the Whig Parly9 and when y@IU Nti:r>e o o o it will be with 
the thanks 0 0 
The a1µ1Quncement fJJf the ,vet~ en August 16 triggeNd a po>lit:1~d 6X<=> 
plosion of massive pl"()pcr~ionso While the message was being ~ad in the 
19ch1tmod11 ~ tylel"@ ppo 223=2240 
2()Ibido9 ppo 225=226i Tyler ,Papen!) vi) 1'751) 1761) Libraey er Ce>Dg?'eSSi 
Poage 11 Henry Claz, PPo 70=72~ Jean Bo Chrlstian to Franklin Mine?'9 August 
7, 1841, in Tylerli Let'tel?'S !1l!Tlmess, II11 406=409i AoHolilo St'fl.~ 0 s state= 
ment in ibido !) Po 78i Botts tO' Tyleri) Aµgus.t 10, 18411) in 1b1do II Po 1050 
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Senate, disorder broke out in the gallery. Democratic Senator Benton of 
Missouri demanded that the Sergeant-at-Arms arrest the pro-bank ruffians 
for insulting the President. In Democratic oiroles there was rejoicing. 
A group of Democratic senators, among them Benton, James &lohanan, and 
Calhoun, called at the White House on August 16 to congratulate Tyler on 
his "patriotic and courageous" action. That same evening a mob of Whig 
demonstrators gathered before the v.ld.te House and raised such a clamor 
that it awakened the household. The mob then paid Tyler the supreme 
political compliment, for they 1:::Jllrned him in effigy, an incident which 
led directly to the passage of legislation establishing a night police 
force in Wasbington.21 
Against a background of these disorders, Clay rose in tb.e Senate on 
August 18 to castigate Tyler. He demanded that Tyler accede to the will 
of the nation as expressed in the Congressional vote on the bank measure 
or do again as he had done in 1836 and re~ign his post. He then intro-
duoed a motion to override the veto. The veto was sustained by a vote of 
25 to 24, which was well below the necessary two-thirds required to set . . 
aside a vetoo 22 The following day, .August 19, Clay demanded an amendment 
to the Constitution to permit the overriding of Presidential vetoes by 
simple majority vote. This too failed to pass. Wkile these heavy-handed 
blows were being delivered on the Senate floor, Clay blandly maintained 
that there was no bad blood between the President and himself. Any rift 
2lcarl Schurz, ~ g,t Henrz Clay (2 vols., New York: Houghton 
.M1.ffiin, 1889), II, p. 207, cited hereinafter as Schurz, ~ Clan 
Benton, Thirty Years !!!!!, II, pp. ' 328-330; Chitwood, :!2!m~Tfler, PP• 228m 
229; Oscar Doane Lambert, Presidential Politics!!!. the United States, 
~-~ (nirham, N.C.: nike University Press, 193b)'; p. 37, cited here-
inafter as Lambert, Presidential. Politics. 
22 Congressional cn.obe, 27th Cong., 1st sess., p. 352. 
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might seem to be developing among the t-lu.g leadersldp lie blamed on un-
named conspirators who wre "beating up tor recruits, and endeavoring to 
form a th:lrd party, with mater~s so scant:, as to be wholly insufficient 
to compose a decent corporal's guard."23 
other Wlaig leaders were as extreme as Cl.a:, in their eriticisn ot the 
President. He was accused ot having violated pledges made in the 
campaign, and in so doing of baving been guilt:, or party perfidy. Tyler 
expected the venom of' Clay, bit he was more disturbed b;y tbe August 21 
pu.b.l..icati.on of the "Coffee Hoo.se Letter" written by his old political 
ally, Botts. It ca.me at the ver,y moment a second bank bill, the Fiscal 
Corporation bill, was being introduced into the House. The temper and 
the timing of the Botts letter convinced Tyler once a.rd for all that all 
't-mig fiscal proposals were designed to accomplish his political destruction., 
Addressed to the patrons of a coffee house in .Ri.camond and dated August 
16, Botts• communication was a savage attack on the President. It pre-
dicted that "Captain Tyler" wou,id veto the ,Dl.striot bank bill in an effo1~t 
to curry favor with the Democrats. Insulting in both tone and content , it 
S1.1ggested that the President would be '."lteaded" and would soon become "an 
object of excretion 1d. th. both parties.• Botts charged further that Tyler 
had "refused to listen to admonitions am entreaties of' his best triends, 
am looked onl:, to tile whisperings or the ambitious and designing mis-
chief makers who have collected around him." This was a reference to the 
same shadowy group Cl.a:, sarcastioal.17 designated a Corpora1vs Gu.aro in 
his anti-Tyler tirade a rev da13 later. 24 
2)Ibid., PP• 368-369; Poage, HePJ7 Clay, PP• 75-78. 
24The "Cottee House Letter" is 1n Ty'ler, Letters .!!!Q. Times, II, P• 
112. 
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Tyler' s motives were seriously questioned by his critics. It was 
charged t hat he wanted to succeed himself, am that by vetoing the bank 
bill he wou.ld hold the states' rights Whigs in line as well as attract to 
I 
himself those Denx>crats who believed in states' rights. '!here is little 
doubt that Tyler wished to succeed himself. The most natural explanation 
for his action i s that he was obeying t he dictates of a states' rights 
conscience. In any case, the veto of the first bank bill greatly ac-
centuated the split that had been gradually developing in the Wlig r ankso 
Whether this breach would be healed or widened depended upon the con-
cessions each side would make in the interest of conciliation. 
Tyler's friends contended that the intention of the Whig majority 
in Congress to break with the President antedated the bank issue. George 
H. Profitt, a Representative from Indiana, who was a member of the 
"Corporal's Guard," said t~at "from the first meeting of Congress up to 
this hour, there has been a determination on the part of some gentlemen 
to create an issue with the President."25 Credence is lent to this SUP-
position by the fact that the bank \tdgs showed dissatisfaction with Tyler 
almost from the beginning. As early as July 4 Clay expressed the fear 
that Tyler's heresies would endanger the existence of the ihig Pa~.26 
This suspicion ot the President on the part of Clay's followers was 
sensed by T:,ler and his f'riends. One of these, Representative GU.mer of 
Virginia, said in the House on July 27 that both he and the President had 
been condemned by the Whigs.27 
25mes• National Register, LXI, p. 93. Henry Clay on occasion 
publicly ref erred to Tyler as the "Corporal" because Tyler's few support-
ers in Congress were often spoken or as the "Corporal's (hard." 
26ca1.v1n Colton, ed. t !!:!!. Speeches !t Henry £L!z (2 v:ola., Bew York: 
A.S. Barnes and Co., 1857), ll, P• 454. 
27.Ad8JIIS, ed., Memoirs, X, P• 515. 
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Whatever may have been their rieal ptrposesil the Whig leader's needed 
to appear willing to approach Tyler in the spirit of ei@mpromiseo A new 
bank measure 9 the 111seal Ccrpcration bill, appeued a ff!lt1 days after 
Tyler0 s August 16 veto ot the District bar.ik blllo In his first message 
Tyler had suggested that certain changes in the. bill might make similar 
legislation aC:leeptable to hi.mo Good politics demanded that the blame ~Olr 
the failure or the fi:r>st bank measure be laid at the doer er the P.!res1= 
dento Aoec:r>dinglysi an effcrt was at onQe made w adjust the dit:reir&nC:les 
between the President and C@ngresso AoHoHo S't1i1U't.si a Whig Representative 
from Virginia.SI was incm.ced to see the P.r>esident with the view t@ <Ol'91J.llilg 
to an understanding with himo Tyler reGeived him Cl@f'(i:lally and 1nd1= 
Ciated that a plan of compromi~e might be agr,eed Ut>@l'.io An amendment w 
this bill had been p~posed on July 13 by- Senat@:z, Ri~ba?"d Ho &.yiud ., ~ 
Stuart new ciffered this amerdment with the elause s~i~ken ~t whilW'l 
authorized the bank to change the agemies in the states in"oo @:tt:i:&"$1 ©f 
discount and deposito After tw., other changes had been made 9 'fylel" Mo 
cepted the plan and asked Staart to go to Webster. and have him pNpaN a 
bill in a@ooroaneie with this ag.f'eemento28 A.Clci@l:roirlg t@ Stwi.rl0 s stisl.~c" 
ments, Tyler did not want to be a.ceased of di~tating ~ Ccng:riesso It 
Stuart eiotdd be instrlmental. in passing ~s bill tlu®ugh O©·ng:wess I) Tyle~ 
would esteem him the "best Me~ I have on ea.rlho"29 
It was at this point that Ty'ler made a serl.<00.s eff@l" in ta~ti~so By 
shcld.ng on this ei~casicn sa.eh enthusiasm ffj'f' a buik am stating tW\Ql day~ 
later in a eal::dnet meeting that a bank bill til!Ql'illd be passed in f'@FtY='91ght 
2~F~r the text cir the Ba~ Amendmentl) witil the mooifi1sJatie)ns S11g= 
gested by Tyler11 see Cbitw~d 9 ~ 'l'ller9 Appendix A., PPo 469=4~'0a 
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hours, he supplied his enemies with ammunition whicm they were nlilt sl~w 
in using against himo. It gave them the exouse for railroading the se~nd 
bill through Congress on the g?'O'lllld that the President wanted quiwe 
actiono And as the President6s enthusiasm tor a :national bank sc@n attelb 
wards began tc wane 9 it a.f'f'eroed a seeming basis. f@r the cma:rge that 
either the President did not know his own mind Gt> else his statement tel 
Smart was an attempt at deceptiono 
After his interview with Ty.lers, · S~ drove to Wabstet>0 s r®sidem:leil 
bat net finding~ at heme9 he :r>ehrmd to his bGa:fdingh~seo Tbat 
evening he :t>epCrted the J:>esalts of his confer>eme w the j@int oommitt- 11 
made up Clif Elllinent Whigs from both Houses ot C,eingresso, At the ~@se ~f 
~ited debate, the committee decided to recommend that the \thtgs in 
afterwards aG<!lept.ed by the vl:dg oaueJUso Jehn Se:rigeant ~f the ~se and 
John Mo Bem..en of the Senate were selected w frame a bill en the basis 
ot the Mng pr~sal. or some other plan tJ~a:ti wdd be a@~eptable tc thei 
Presidento'.30 They weF& w seek an interview nth Tyler9 if nN,ss:sur9 t!Q) 
make cel!-G&in that the?>e was no misunderstanding @f his @pim©i~Sio Clwi.y 
was scihedul.ed w deliver his S~Mlh against the first vet@ cm August l7o 
It was decl.ded 9 in agreement with ClaySJ that his speec1h 'lrofdd be ~st.=. 
pcned until Augus~ 19 as it was antioipated that his @omments might an=, 
tagonize Tyle?'o 31 
'l'hese e.tf'orts at ~ompromise would indieate that the Whigs were 1:>c;ul.y 
desirous of meeting the Pt>esident0 s wishes am e:»t a:f'.f'iving at Ml'm@ritr in 
30'lhe original Fisllal. Corpt,ration bill was the Nsw..t er a pN p(Q)aid 
made by SeM'Ettary of' ~e 'lreaSllry Ewing a.t the nquest of C@ngl'~$So 
31Bentcn1> 1'h1rt.v Years ~1> IIsi Po '.347 o 
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the part;yo fliat sach was the sin(jere intention of a muaber cf vlligs .the?>e 
can be no doubto On the other handj the cont;imums ponncli.ng of the 
P!'esident b;y the Whig pressj the terrible pronoumem.ent against him b:, 
Cl.a;yj and other abusive attaeks an him in 1:>cth hcmses er Ocngressp GUlmi"" 
nating in the insulting Coffee House Istter of Botts 9 tem to show that 
the dominant leaders were trying to widen rather than close the bNa®h in 
the part;yo There is some evidence in support ot the cmarge that they had 
decided . to offer a second bank bill of sueh a wtan~ter as w emb&H>ass 
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the President and ea.use the ~signa.ti~n of his cabinet o 
Se:rgeant and B&niien had tw oonferences with th! President r~r the 
pl1?'pese of ooming tc a:n umerstand~g with him on the bank qiieri,i~no 
Following the p:t>eoedent of Madisonj Ty-ler declined to disouss with them 
the details of aw suggested plano He. did state a pNf'eren~e f ~'Z' a fistial 
agency- divested of .the discounting power a.rd limited w dEiali~ in bills 
of exohangeo He declared his dete:rmina.tion to CO'Jnfer with the ~abinet as 
to whether the assent cfl the states ought to be requi:Nd in th& establish= 
ment of agencies w be employed b;y the om>~raticn)3 Af'tel" Ty~e:t' talked 
with his cabinets, Ewing was to wfk out details eif a bcU1 ld:tbl ~m.t@:t' 
BeH"ien and Representative Sergeant., The wee met in the looghgs (ljf 
. ' 
tormit,: with the views of the P.toesident as l"ep8ated b;y Ewingo ~m the 
ske~h thus wtlined 11 Sergeant pioepam the Fis@d C@~~&ti@n bill whi@h 
he afte?W.?'ds introdeed into the Ho'tise of' Rep~sentativeso34 
32w.uli,.m Russell and John Taliaferrq) to Tyler (C@n:fidential.} 9 
Augu.st 16 11 184111 in Tyler1> Istters eg, Times9 II9 po 810 




Sergeant sul:m.t~ his bill in the )louse on F?'ida7!il Augmst 201) and 
the next dq a printed eiopy of it was plaeed en the desk e,f ea~h membero 
He also offe~d a resolution providing that the debate en the bU1 be 
eilcsed net later than fO'lll" c 0elCGk that same a.ftermcno James -Ia &os&=> 
velt of New York moved that all debate be stopped at ome, as the short 
period allowed was the equivalent to shutting off debate entirelyo 
Sergeant then ohanged his resc:dutiain so as t.ci extend the time cf dil!l<;, 
cussion f'J:"'.O'm Saturdq to ~nday atternocno Sev:eH.l. Demioorati~ Elllbe:t>s 
asked t@ be fl'JWUS$d fioan voting as they had mt h~ time w eDJJdne th6 
billo 
Mcnday9 .August 2'.3, after debate on the bill, it was ?'ep@rted w thl9 Com= 
mittee of the Whole and passedb The final vote was 12.5 tc 940 '!he bill 
' . 
was repcrled to the Senate the f~~ da;r and was p?>ffllli>tly ~.f'~~ t© 
a selerclt ecamittee by the President cf' the Senateo'.36 
. ' 
Ber.rlen51 ehaiman of the sele@t ~ommittee 51 :r>apol'ted the &use bill 
to the Senate withoa.t amendment en M@ndq!il Augiist 30 9 whe:N, it was taken 
up by the Cmnmi ttee of the Whole ~n Wadnesday !il Septeniber lo BelH>iM 
spoke fer mere than tw hou.rs in fa.vol' of the new cdll 9 sa:ying that it 
wool.d be UJGepted by the Pf>esidento The measm>e was ~pcsed by Rives and 
the leaQ!ng Denweirat!D Senators, sui~h as Benjamin ~PJ>P.9 Bent@n ilnd 
Blulhanano The pN'ri;sicm fer bfils @f &JWhange9 they md,nt,dned 11 W®'Wld 
pel'mit a diseeiunting .of p?'Glmisseey net,ss!il a ~ wh:wh the Pt>®sident. was 
umdll1ng t@ g?>ant to a m.tilOlm.1 bwk withnt the ass®nt «llf' th® m'telso 
Olay supl)®l°ted .the bUl though it did net g-c as fall' as M d'8~~o & ?'8= 
garded it cf s@me value!il as it plN'Vided fer the :r~gtilati.@n @f ~:r 
35e@;np:essi~ml Glcbe51 27th C@ngo)) ~st Sesso!) ppo 366=:3680 
'.36Ibidap ppo 370=)'?2; Benton,i ibirj.Y Yeu's View9 :tI51 Po '.3370 
emhanges of the eountr-,- and auth@:ri.zed a na;t.i~n=,wide smppl;y @f ~ft'eney-
ot uniform valueo After several amendmen'.ts pr@posed by Dem@@2"aU@ leade:ris 
bad been voted down, the bill passed the Senate @n September :3 by a v@te 
of 27 to 220:37 
Given the polit:wal and emotional atm<llsphe:r>e ef the time, Tyler0s 
veto of the Fiscal Corporation bill on September 9 was ne>t whw.ly un= 
ex:peetedo .The bill was b:rought forth in so short a time after T;rler0 s 
f'irst veto as to preclude careful preparatiMo ijast y ~10>nsult atiein bet ween 
Whig emissaries and the President DN'light f~h a ocmplex p:ieci<ei @f legiso 
lationo The Mtual framing of the bill. md the d6td.ls cf its svi'bnissi@n 
md passage T.rler unwisely left to his ~ab~ He did take the p::N= 
~aution cf expressing w his ~a.bi.net his wishes in the f'nming @f the 
bllllil and he Us@ insisted th&t he be shewn its f'1nal w?'ding b5f@l"e it 
was sent b, the &;useo 
By a f'allU!"e in Cil011Jl111Uli~ticn w1 thin the wp e~hel@ns @f the ad= 
. . . 
'lhi.s slight infu?'la¥ him and ce>ntribii:ed ~ his devel@ping Mti~ns that, 
a full=bl@Wl'l Whig C@Di:,--p.ira~y was in .~Pe?'&tion agair&st himo He ~-&s el!l= 
peeially upset wien \>ebster and Ewing cf his @abinet stat®d publidy that 
the new bill oonf@med to the P!oes1dent 0 s cpim.erui and oo~ his appNVdo 
I t was ebvioos that bis suggestie:in that the bill C1Jleita.iPly :i:"@(JUi~ st.at <s 
aasrel?i1t f'or establishment fiJ! bank bran(::lhes had been ign~:tiad o N@;;E> did th<il 
.final f@:rm smi t T;rle'.f'o In his @pim.@nl) the rlg~t @f the states t@ I>l1""1o 
hibit branches mts not adequately p N te!Cl~ s, am the P®W@~s giV®n the 
.Fiscal. CorpGration in the area ot disrcoonting and :t\e.newing n®tes wa.s 67..= 
O@?'pCllt"&.ticn would be ohartend by Congress a~ting a.a a nati@nd a~se~ 
and not as a legisl,ata.ra of the Dishlct of C@lumbiao ~ Tyle?>0 s 
standpoint the new legjslation9 nppcsedly the brain Ghild of his cab1net9 
was as unsatisfacst<V17 as the District bank bill had been)8 
Al.though Tyler decided at on~e to veto the second bank bfil 11 he 
kept it for six 4'1ys befo:t"e returning it with his ~bjecticm.so The gene%6 
al. tone of the message indicated that he was very rel'li<llt&nt to withhold 
his assent f'Nm the measureo In thus dashing the h~pes of the bank t-lngs 
flCl?' a se~cmd time he was acting on what he considam an im:ptill:'ative sense 
~f ."~~nstitllt1ond dutyo" He was willing ~ g~ as far as his p.rl,r1<~iples 
would permit "OOWa:tld ~Mtdl.iati@n11 mt the bill he held w be ~l~2>ly ~ 
oonstitutionalo His strongest point ws his oppositicm w establishing 
braMhes11 or •agemies" as the bU.l Cilalled them9 in the states wlthwt 
their assento H~ expressed the hope that Cong:t>ass llreW.d take m :fu:rih~:t' 
a~ti@n on a bank blll9 and intimated that at th~ ~rdng of thtl ~I!~ 
sessicn he ~d have a p:Hllpcsal te ~:ftf'ero39 
The oomiliat@ey -.!!l @f the P.Nsident0 s message did neit oosld@n it 
against the blows that ws:N hul"led at ito As was expe®tedil the :s~@nd 
veto let lc~se a flood or o~iti~:iemo On the day at;ter the ve~ message 
a~ciusing him ~f treaeher.r t@ the ~ Party o He ns answem by Gllmeill:'9 
who "was net less pers~y seve.7:'e ~n &itts 9 lih'5J :NJsent.8d it ~e in 
tempe:r> than in WO?'ds o ,.40 Had the bill passed ii 1 t 1,a l..ik:el.y ths:t t he bank 
wow.d n®t have been ~~esstully la~hedo The agitaUon @f I)em@<ail"at s md 
'.39rcr the text &! this message see Riehards@nil edo O &issagrei)! ~ 
Paperso IV, PPo 68m72o ' 
40Adams 9 edo 9 Memehs 9 XI, Po 120 
their determination t,c, k1ll a barik would doubtJ.ess have Mghtened off 
sa.bscribers and prevented the sale of' adequate s~s or stoeko41 There 
did not seem to be at any time a strong popl:\lar demand for a national 
banko The victory of the Whigs in 1840 could not be ClOn.str11ed as a man.. 
date :f'rom the people to establish a tank, for the~ pc21tt1.• was ne"i7e:r 
made el.ear in the campaigno As Webster sa.id in 1843: "ltle cares any ... 
thing now about bank bills which were vetoed in 18410 o o oar tha.t9 it 
there were no such thing as a veto o o o a Banko o o upon the old models 
42 
could be established?" Nobody ca.red, for l?rosperl.ty retur.oed to the 
countr,"o 
On Sep'tflllber 13, the da.y Congress adjGU.rned~ some ti.tty or more er 
the lea.ding Whig members or Congress held a caucras and issued an address 
' ' 
to the people of the United Stateso Dew.a.ring that the spee!lial sesm.cn 
of Congress had been cilled to enact the Whig program wbicll had. been 
generally understood by the eleeit1»:N.te \n the eampaign ef 1840 v the lings 
concluded that their Presiden, had pr@Ved ~elf treacih$:r@US by t~Ung 
those aimso Tyler had 11 they saidp used the vet.G power n~t w sastain his 
conseiientious scimpless, but rather to alter the existing party alignment so 
Sime Tyler by bis actiens had voluntarily sepaN.ted himself' fNm the 
partys, the alliance between the !Tesidem a!¥i the Whigs was a.tan endo43 
His exgdsion from the party was now formal, and ~ompleteo Hemef~zit h 0 
Tyler was a hesident withnt a part.yo · Not @nly was 'l'yle:t> a ~sident 
410hitwod 9 ~ T;yler;s, ppo 2~=2490 
42Daniel Websterp ~ ,Writings aJQ Speeehes ~ Denie!. Web~:t (Nati~l'!P 
al. F.di tions, 18 VW.So , Beston & Little Brownp 19()) h XV ll po 18111 cii ted 
here~r as Webster, Wr>itlngs ~ Speeehesl) · 
43m.ies 0 National !k!gisteril LXIS> ppo 35='.36; Ge.®:rge To Cartis9 ~ ~ 
Daniel Webster {2 vol.so 9 N~ Yerkg Do . Appleton and Ceo 9 18?2) s, II9 ppo 
207=2090 
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without a party, bu.t now he was w:t~i,.t a oabinatil for in the political 
battles all the oabinet members had resigned except Webster. 
CHAPl'ER IV 
THE CABINET CRISIS 
Tyler, like John Adams bef'ore .and Andrew Johnson after him, in-
herited a ready-made cabinet. This circumstance was a handicap to the 
inoondng President in all three instances. In each case the Chief' Eltecu-
tive had as his of'f'icial advisers men whose loyalty to someone else was 
stronger than that which they f'elt f'or their chief'. 
Harrison's cabinet consisted of Webster of Massachusetts, Secretary 
of' State; Ewing or Ohio, Secretary of' the Treasury; John Bell of' Tennessee, 
J 
Secretary of War; George c. Badger of' North Carolina, Secretary of the 
Navy; John J. Crittenden of Kentucky, Attorney General; and Granger of' New 
York, Postmaster General. 
Normally, the President has a free hand int.he selection of his 
cabinet, but Tyler, coming into the Presidency in an accidental manner, 
was faced with a cabinet which he must either keep or replace with men of' 
his own choice. In succeeding to the Presidency with the cabinet already 
in existenoa, any decision regarding it was bound to have complications. 
'!be lrlligs were not unmindtul of the practice followed from Jet'f'erson to 
Jackson whereby cabinet officers had frequently outlasted Presidents in 
their posts. It was at this time by no means an established rule that the 
members of the cabinet should always be men of' the President's free choice. 
Nor was .the President necessarily presumed to be tree to consult with the 
members and accept or reject their advice on his own responsibility. ~gs 
were especially fond of' referring to the cabinet as the President's 
47 
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•con.sti tutional adviserso .,1 
There was scme newspaper speculation to the effect that Tyler could 
not keep Harrison° s cabinet without again commissioning the memberso It . . 
was a:rgued that since the membe1"S held their commissions e.:t his plean.re, 
the President had a legal basis for making a completely tree choiceo 
.Tyler ola.imed the Presidency in his ~wn right and was not merely acting 
in the place ot the departed Harrison; thus, he was pres\llll9d to have a 
meaSUl"e of' treedom which cou.ld not have been accorded a mere "acting" 
Presiden't,o Contl"ary to this viewp the extreme Whig position was that the 
members would not resigno "This ffiabinet members resignat.io!V is the 
practice in monal'Ohiee,," wrote the Penn'11vanian 11 "whee ministers are 
the K'ing 0 s servan~s. In our r~ublic they are the servants ot the peoplei) 
and commissioned by the consent ot the Senate to of'fioes created by lawo•2 
It may reasonably be concluded trom this Whig view er the Presiden:t,0 s 1"9= 
lations with the cabinet that he could remove members only with the oon= 
sent of' the Senateo It was noted editorially in the New York .Ame?'ican 
that "when JoQ. Adams succeeded Mt-. LJameJ Monroe, Mro flohDT !bLean 
o o o Mro f.sa•el LJ Southard o o o and Mro ,{!in.lliai{ Wirt retained their> 
commissions withoat an.r new appointment or intermediate res1gnationo•3 
The theory and practices af'tecting the President Os capinet were not 
the same in 1841 as they were before or have been since that timeo These 
matters have been settled by individllal Presidents as a highly personal 
matter11 with political oonsideJ:"ations infiuencing their deoisionso In 
lcorwin, .Presidtntial Oftioe11 Po '78o 
2'ftmall'/lvanian11 April 10 11 1841 11 quoted in NU9s 0 National ,Regi11t.r11 
LX, Po 80 . 
3New York Amerioan 11 April 11 9 1841 11 quoted in ibido 
reaching his decision to keep Harrison°s cabinet9 Tyle.r made one or his 
most serious nd.stakeso All the members of Han'ison°.s cabinet, except 
Webster and Granger, were partisans of Cla:,o In the controvers:, .that 
wnld inevitably follow between Tyler and Clay, ~ould the latter e~ 
deavor to O&rl'Y th?"ough CongNss his nation,l~stic program, a majority ot 
the .President0s cabinet wo-1.d be allied 14th the oppositiono NQr was he 
sure of the taithrul. _au.pport of Webst,er and Grangero Webstel" was the 
dean ot the natio~ists and_ in tormer times had been rega!'ded by 'lyler 
ae th• a.rch enemy ot soand political dootrineo 4 Ae it turned out9 Webster 
gave no trouble and cordial relations grew up between t.he pNmier and his 
ohiet 9 so that 1n later years Tyler rega~ed Webster as ~the tirst among 
stateaen-~ and "the model ot a cab~t ottioero .S 
Appar11ntly the members of the cabinet were not inclined to ·aGcord 
Preal.dent .Tyler the deteNnce which his position gave him the right to 
expeoto .A.ooording to a stor:, Nlated atterwa~s by John 'l'ylel"p Jl"os, the 
President0 s private secretary, Webster at the first cabinet meeting held 
by T,yler expressed to the President the hope and expectation that he ,n:,'llld 
caZ"17' out the ideas and cust•e er his predeoeseoro Webster then wnt en 
to state that eder Harrison it had been the practice tor all JllMANs re ... 
lating to the administration to be brought before the cabinet and be de= 
aided b:, majozoit)" vote, the P.Neident having but one voteo T;ylerll ama~eds, 
arose and said, .~bstantially9 ~I am veey glad to have in my Cabinet aoh 
able stat.amen as o o o yourselveso o o o I sball o o o avail myself ct 
your counselo o o 'bllt, I, ae J)resident, shall be responsible tor rrry 
4'.ry'ler Papers 9 I, 6283 11 Libra:17 ot Congresso 
S'l'yier11 Letters and X!,lll!le III11 po 197 o 
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administrationo ,.6 In this manner Tyler announced his intentionso 
Under such circwn.stances only two alternatives were open to the 
Presidento He could dismiss Harrison9 s cabinet or he collld accept it and 
lean heavily upon a group or friends, a "Kitchen Cabinet," tor adviceo 
In order to avoid a family row at the outset or his administration he de= 
cided to retain Harrison's cabinet and choose as his real advisers a small 
grwp of :friends who were sympathetic to his states' rights viewso For 
this unofficial cabinet he oh.ose Dr.. 'lhomas Ro Dew, president of Wllliam 
' 
and Mary College; Judge No Beverly Tacker of Williamsburg; Representatives 
Wise, Gilmer, Francis Mallory, and Caleb Cushing; a:nd Senator William Co 
Rives .. Dr. Dew and Judge 'l\tcker were the "eggheads" of the groa.p, though 
they probably did not exert as mch influence on the President as some of. 
the otherso Dew's duties at the College kept him at Williamsburg, and it 
was o111y during the special session of Congress in 1841 that he was in 
Washingtono Judge 'l\toker0 s influence was limited to the ea1..,ly months of 
the tem, for by September, 1841, he had cooled to.ward Tylero 7 F'irst in 
importance of these advisers was Wise.. Tyler later said ot hims "He is 
truly a most extraordinary mano I have known but one man more thoroughly 
at home upon all Sllbjects an:! that is L.W. Tazewello"S 
It is lfflf'ortunate when a President is forced to seek advice ou.tside 
the legally ordained channels. Some Presidents have Sllooessf'Ully em.. 
ployed a group of unotticial advisers, but few have been toroed to rely 
on such a group as was Tylero A liaison with an unofficial group generally 
6B1.nkley, President !!!! Congress, ppo 92-93; Morgan, ~ jn.battledll 
Po 59, noteeo 
?Tucker to Mrso Tucker, September 13, 1841 11 in Tyler, Letters ~ 
Times, II, po 5440 
8fyler to Robert Tyler, May 22, 1859, in ibido, po 5500 
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ar,ouses jealcrasies within the official cabinet and w1 thin the pa.rty o 
. '!his is particularly true wheni as in this casei the uiwftieiial advisers 
are not qualified by wi.sdo~ and experience for so great a responsibilityo 
Tyler did not in th~ beginning h~ve. the benefit of the sanest co nselo 
Wise was unequ.al to the i,,le of me.ntor te the Presidento He was brilliant 
bltt young, and his jud~ent lacked the stability that oomes with year~ and 
expel"ienoe o Too often he let emotion take the pl.ace of reasono 
The new ~dministration sta:t"ted out with every indication of hafflQn,yl) 
I 
but in a short time signs of disd/ard began to appearo Thel"e was no actual 
friction until J\tly11 184lsi when the eihief ol.e:t>k in the land office dis= 
missed thirteen or his assistantso Ten of the dismissed employees ap,=, 
pealed to 'l'ylersi who ordered their r>einstatemento As Ewing 11 the Secr8= 
tary of the Treasury, had appN!V&d the action o,f the ~hief ~lerk9 h~t 
words passed between the Secretary and the Ptoesidento Btlt. W.s was not a 
serio•s quarrel, and the disagreement passed overo9 
'lhe imlnediate occasion of the dis?'Uption or the cabinet was the vetc 
or the second bank bill by the Presidento 'lbe oabinet was in favor or a 
national. bank si and all its menibers except Webster r>esig~ed in pr>ctest 
against the vetco In or>der that their resignations might weaken and em=, 
ba?'T'ass Tyler9 it was ananged that they should be made in lll.Jlison and 
announoed in a drama.tie wayo With. the view to agreeing upon somf» plan of 
wd ted a.ctionsi Secretaey Badger invited 111 the membel?"s of the oabinet to 
a dinner at his home on Septembe:ri 9o All were piresent except Gioange?'o 
When Webster saw that it would be a meeting with Clay9 who was u.so 
presentsi he left the Badger homeo The other's i in a meeting after the 
evening meal 9 d!9eided to resign in a body and together make cpen war 
9Tyler to Dro Dew9 July 29 11 1841, in ibido !) Ill11 Po 1J3o 
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against the administrationo Althoagh Clay was a member of the dinner 
party, he did not attend the meeting at .which the deciision was madell lmt 
was talking to the family in another room or the Badger homeo The ta<rJt 
that he was present in the house at the time lent sappo:rl to the cilaim 
tba t the disruption of the cabinet was planned by ~ayo lO 
Webster was 11rged to join them, Tyler maintained 9 "and it was de= 
olared to him that if he would resign 11 I woud necessarily have to vaGate 
the government by Saturday nigh't,, and tlms Whig ru.le would be tho~hly 
re~establishedo" Webster had too much sagacity no~ to see that what 
would happen -would be the establishment of "Clay rule cnlyll and 2>1cthing 
ll101"9o ttll 
According to plan9 all the membel"S sent in their> resignations @n 
Satm'day11 September llo John Tyler, Jro, was pNsent when the letter's 
came in and noted the exact time at which each al"rl.vedo The first a!f=. 
rived at 12(30 PoMo and the last at .5f30 PoMo In the aftem@oin ~bs'tel" 
came in and asked the President what he shou.ld dco The P:z.iesident npliedll 
"Yeu must decide that for yourself, Mro Webstero" Wheresa.p@n WebettJ?> i~ 
stantly said 9 "If you leave it to me, Mro President!il I will stay when I 
amo" Tyler9 rising from his seat, extended his hand to ~bster> and waru:r 
declared, "Give me your hand on that, and now I will say to~ that Heney 
\ 
Clay is a doomed ma.no "12 
All of the members who resigned si except Granger\, sent letters giving 
reasons tor their aotiono G.t"anger9 the politieal ally of ~bste~~ h&d n~ 
serious grievance against the President, but resigned rath~r th&nsepao 
rate from his t"rierds in ~ngress and in .the oabineto In a conve?,'sation 
with Hone, he expl.•ined that his chief' cause of dissatisfaction with the 
President was .his retusal to turn Democrats out of office and put 1'111gs 
in their places. Some violent and active opponents or the administnticnp 
he said, had been retained because the .President was endeaToring to win 
recrd ts trem the opposition te the party ~ich he was trying to f ft'Dl in 
his own interesto .'Ib.e letter of Crittenden was short1> stating that he 
was not in accord with the President, especially with his veto policysi 
and he felt that he should res1gn.13 
In other letters the retiring cabinet members expressed marked disQ 
agreement with 'lyler•s veto policy. The most violent of these attacks was 
made by Ewing. Not o~y did he tlay the President fer his attitude toward 
the seoom bank bill, b1:t, he charged that t .he Iwishington correspondent of 
the New York Herald, a Tyler newspaper, had been al:Nsive of' the cabinet 
and had betrayed a lmolil.edge of' cabinet secretso This .,..id indi~ate that 
there had been a leak, and it was intimai.ci that Tyler was responsible fer 
14 this leak. 
\ilatever partisan advantage the Clay element of the Whig Party may 
have sowght to gain thrngh either the bank isne er the cabinet resig= 
nati~.n1, they did :not accomplish their purpose.. The President refused 't,o 
be cowed. Clay n,ad hoped that by forcing the ~binet to resign on Satur,:, 
day before tbe Congress was tp adjovn on Monday, Tyler wowld be 1.Ul&ble 
to form a cabil'let in tj.me to have Senate oonf'irmationo This would leave 
13Bevins9 Pbillip Bone, pp. 563-564. 
14Ew:tng•s statement is in Benton, 'l'hirty Years !!llsi III> po 345i 
later siatement on the same mbject is ~oted in Nll~s0 National. ·Register!) 
LIII9 PP• 244-246. . 
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the President 1d. thout a oabinet until the. next regular session s~heduled 
to meet 1n December, 1841, or would force the resignation of 'lylero In 
that event Sam.el L. Southard, the president ot the Senate, wo-.J.d suco,ed 
te the Presidency uder laws then in tc.,rce. Bu.t Tyler had thnght about 
the rearrangement et his cabinet, and this mass resignation merely gave 
him the opportuity.15 lncleed, ne.gotiations had been under way tor some 
time _tor the torut1on ot a new cabinet, so that Tyler was able to su1:md.t 
to the Sel'l&te the names ot the new heads ot departments on -Monday, Sep.. 
tember 13, the dq Congress had set tor adjo~ento The nominations nre 
immediately conf'irmed 0 l6 
Tyler• s promptness in_ the selection ot a Jilew cabinet was d\te te an 
erroneous interpretation of ~h,e Constitution. 'lyler claimed that he could 
make no cabinet appoint.ments af'~r the adjovnment ot the Senate and collld 
net, therefore, ~arr:, on the busil'J,ess of pverment daring the interim be ... 
twee~ sessions.17 In such a case he would practically be forced to resign 
and pel'mit t.he nccession of the president E.!. tempore of the Senateo A 
speci,al election WOllld then have been hel.d which might give C1ay his 
chance fer the Presiclencyo 
In the selection et a new ca}:)inet, Tyler called 11pon men "who W8:f8 
Jackson men in the beginning," but then breke with him and left the Demo= 
cratic Partyo ~ey were men ot ability ud lmowledge and confol'Dled to 
l5Ma.ey lf:l.nsdale, ! Hister;v: ot le!, President0 s Cabinet (Ann Arbor; 
University of Michigan Press, 19ll),' pp. ll2-ll'.,. 
16Po.,ge, Henry Clay, P• 96. 
l'lTyler's oonstl"llction is incorrect in that the Constituti on states8 
"The President shall have po-wr ' to .!_ill--ttp all vacancies that may ha.ppe.il 
during the recess of the Sem.te, by g~ntil'lg commissions which shall ex= 
pire at the end of their next session." Constitlltion, Arto III) Seco 211 
olo 3o Tyler's vacancies occurred tw days before Congress recessedo 
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Tyler's opinions "on the subject of a national bank. nl.8 Tyler was one 
President who relied heavily on the advice of his cabinet in the formula-
tion ot policy, on~e be had secured control ot his official household and 
had established a measure of harm.ony between himself and his department 
heads. Abel P. Upshur, the Secretary of the Navy, and Hugh Isgare, · the 
. . 
Attorney Ge~ral, were able lawyers, though neither had been in a position 
by this time to make a name for himself. Isgare, a South Carolinian, was . 
not in the good graces of Calhoun, and his selection indicated that the 
administration was asking no favors of the South Carolinian. Upshure was 
a judge of the General Court of' Virginia in 1826 when Tyler was governor, 
and he had played a prominent role in the Virginia Constitutional Conven-
tion of 1829-1830. William H. Spencer, the Secretary of vilr, had been as-
sociated with Tyler in the House of Representatives. At the time of his 
appointment he was Secretary of State for New York and had lately been 
active in opposing the administration. For this reason surprise was ex-, 
pressed that Tyler would offer and he would accept the position. Walter 
Forward of Pennaylvania, the Secretary of the Treasury, and Charles A. 
Wickliffe, the Postmaster Gene~al and ex-governor of Kentucky, completed 
the new cabinet. It.was said that John Joblsan of Ohio had been offered the 
position of Secretary of vilr, and that the post of Secretary of the Navy 
had been offered to Representative Wise, but both declined appointment.19 
The clamor for W3bster•s ~esignation became greater after negotiations 
with Lord Ashburton had been completed. He grew tired of hearing the odi~ 
that attached to him because of his connection with the Tyler administration. 
18 Tyler to Tazewell, September 15, ~841, in Tyler, Istters !!J2. ~, 
II, P• 131. . 
19 Niles• National Register, LXI, p. 33; Tyler Papers, II, 6405, 
Library of Congress. 
.Besides, when the President teok •P 'hxas :negotiatiens it would be em-,. 
barrassing to have a Secreta17 et state who was epposed to annexatien. 
Both Tyler and Webster were amd.ns that the latter• s retirement W91ll.d be 
etteo'ted without disturbing the cordial :r.-elations that st1ll ·erlsted be-
tween them. .Webster made up his mind ia the spring or 1843 .t• ~tbdraw 
f'Nm the cabinet. The cerrespendence by whiqh the resignation was ac-
cepted was Gf' the most cerdia.l .ata.re, am the two maintained w.ninter-
npted friendship lllltil the death or Webster. 20 
The cabinet changes of September, lSZl,1, were only the beginning of . . 
numer•s changes to tollow. .DI.ring his term, Tyler made nineteen ohanges 
te head the five executive departments. Three ot these appointments were 
the results er deaths of cabinet members and tw appointees failed te re-
ceive centirm.atien by the Senate. Fou.rteen appointments ~re the result 
or resignations. This retlects Tyler's desire to surround himself with 
subordinates who were competent am willing te execute bis policies with-
out impertant reservations. A member of' Tyler's cabinet usually had a 
thankless job, tor hens st1bjected to crit.1011111 f'rom all sides, thus 
ma.king his position untenable.21 
20eurt1s, Daniel Wabster, II, pp. 130.131 .. 
.. 
21Webster, Writings !W! Speeches, XVI, pp .. 40Zl-40.5o 
CHAPt'ER V 
T1;IE SEX:ONl) SESSION AND IMPEA.CBHENT MOVES 
Having 'V'etoed two Whig bank bills, Tyler felt a strong personal 
obligation to devise a fiscal scheme et his own 'Which would facilitate 
interstate banking operations while remaining entirely constitutional in . 
structure and fui:ictien. He was also under presnre !'rem his .friends t• 
produce a plan which would prGVide a pe:rmanent settlement et this questictn. 
Thus Tyler lef't the cap~tal in mid-Ootober tor a much needed .rest in 
Wllliams'bllrg, where he planned to "meditate · in peace ,over a. acheme ,of 
finance." By- Decembf)r, 1841, he . bad wrked out a plan which was basically 
' . . •· . 
a versi•n ot ene Jacks•n pz:opo~ed in 18)0. Tyler had seme help from 
Littlet.n w. Tazewell, an •ld friend who had lett the l>higs te return to 
the Democratic fold. It was a .system in which state banks would play an 
impertant part.1 
'l'yler''s idea envisiened a public banking 1nstitutien directed by a 
n•npa.rtisan Beard of Con.trel in Washington, ~th agencies, some et them 
state banks, leoated in principal N.nancial centers throughout the 
' . . ~ 
country. Be capital was to be raised by pn:vate subsoriptiens, so the:re 
' ' 
would be m private stockholders. The agencies, or branches, ~d fa-
cilitate inter~tate oommeroe by being authorized to bay- and sell domestic 
bills and drafts. The bi-anohes co~d also r,eoeive deposits of gold and 
silver and issue negotiable oert.ltioates tor these metals ~t would 
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circu.late as currency. Goverrunent monies would be deposited in the 
agencies and these deposits would permit the government, through the 
issuance or :recall of Treasury notes, to . increase or decrease the amount 
ot sound money in circulation at any time. It was a well-conceived 
system. .. ~e sove~ignty of the states was protected in a provision which 
forbade the branches to transact any business of a private nature which 
would ·be in conflict with the laws of ,itates in which they functioned. 
The 'l)'ler proposal combined a states• rights approach with a national aP-
proach that would relieve the Chief Executive from a controlling power 
over the public Treasury. 2 1 
When the scheme was submitted to the cabinet, it received enthusiaa-
tic support. Spencer, who had been one of the strongest opponents of the 
second Bank or the United States, and Webster, who had always been an 
ardent champion of a national bank, praise~ the p.lan. Spencer said tha t 
it had been approved by some of the most competent financiers of this 
country and England, who called it "safe for all our wants," and would 
turnish the "most perfect currency that could be devised." It would ac-
complish all interstate banking needs without stimulating anew the reck-
less spirit of speculation. 3 Webster in his Faneuil Hall speech in Boston 
said that thi's Exchequer plan, as Tyler named it, had his hearty approval. 
He was willing to stake his reputation that, 1! the vld.g Congress would 
give it a fair trial, within three years the whole country would admit it 
to be the most beneficial measure ever adopted, the "Constitution only ex-
cepted • ..4 
2Tyler• s Exchequer plan in Tyler Papers, II, 6433, Library of Congress. 
3~, National Register, LXII, p. 141. 
4 Webster, Writings ,and Speeches, III, pp. 133-135 . 
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The President j,n his first annual message, December 7, 1841, gave an 
outline or his pl.an of finance that the S~cretaey of the 'l'reasuey wGUl.d 
present in detail to Congress, should it so desire. At the request of 
Cushing, tne Secretary of the Treasury presented the President's scheme. 
l)espite the merit or the proposal it was doomed to failure. By falling 
somewhere between the Democrat• s Independent Tt-easury and Clay• s bank it 
satisfied the parti.sans of neither approach. Both attacked it. The Er,-
chequer pl.an had no chance politically, although it represented the 
middle course which characterized the remainder of the Tyler administl"ation. 
In spite of' a vigorous fight for the plan by Congressmen Cushing, Wise, 
Pro.f'i tt and others of the "Corporal's Guard," the project was tabled wi.th.-
out adequate discussion in the 1841 .. 1842 session. That was the end of' it, 
and public monies continued to lie in selected state banks, which 11111st 
' 
have delighted old .Jaoksonians.5 
By July, 1842, the relationship betnen the executive and the legis-
lative branoh had reached a stalemate. Whig strategy was to produce 
legislati.on the President coa.ld not appl"Ove, and then charge perfidy, 
treason, and exea,itive dictatorship when the expected veto was de.livered. 
T;rler, in. turn, continued to veto legisl•tion he could not stomach while 
vigorously' defeNH,.ng his right to do so. He also steadily declared his 
desire to harmonize 'Id.th Congress in the e~c'l;Jllent of' all n.eoessaey 
meaSUl'es if' the majority in Congress would pe?mit him to do so. In his 
relations with Congress in 1842, Tyler co'19tantly searohed for that 
"moderation, 'Mhich is the mother of' t.ne. wisdom," and toa.nd little. He . 
remarked in June, 1842, with sadness tinged with frustration, "I f'ear that. 
5Tyler• s 1841 annual message in Richardson, ed., Message_s !!!4 P&airs, 
IV, pp. 84-87; Ty1er, Letters !D2, Times, II, pp .. 131-134; Copgressio:na · 
(D..obe, 27th Cong., 2nd sess., pp. 248-249. 
more firmness and wisdom are necessary to carry us safely through the 
trial than I can in any way lay claim to • .,6 
The C.lq-domi:na ted Congress was• Tyler . fumed, a do-no_thing body 
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whose sole tunation was the de.stl"llction or the administration in prepara-
tion tor the coming mid-~rm elections. In his annual message ot December 
7, 1841, 'lyler had called for his Exchequer plan, a new tarirf'-tor-rnenue 
bill which would "atf'ord to manufacturing interests ample aid," and an ex-
pansio.n of' the Army and Navy.. By July, 1842, none or these vital projects 
bad been acted upon. "It nothing has been do~e ~ accomplish any- of these 
.objects," Tyler said, "the fault is not with the Exeouti.,ve." He thought 
it "partiaal.arly abominable that this miserable Congress should not even. 
yet have passed the Ar,q or Navy appropriation bill," thus "subjecting the 
country to be browbeat" by the Mexican dictator, Santa Anna .. The Congress 
had not brought torward a single important measure. On the contrary, ao-
~oJ,"ding to Upshur, theirs was the ·"deliberate pa.rpose to make .Clay ~esi-
dent o o • nen at the hazard ot revolut~on." 'l'J;1e time had finally come, 
thought Upshur, f'ff the people in bo:th parties to "shake off their leaders, 
and come •i onoe to the rescue of' the oou.ntry."7 
As the government ot the Unit.d States virtually ceased to function, 
~er became inoreat,ingly aware of' the paintul. tact that the treasury was 
bare. A national debt of over five million dollars had been left by tbe 
Van atren administration, along ~th an unbalanced budget f'or 1840-1841 
. ' . 
which ultimat.ly raised the debt to $17,?.'.36,000 by Ja:rmary 1, 1842. The 
6'1)'ler to Nathaniel Bo Tuc,ker, June 16, 1842, in fyler, kttera e! 
'1'1mes, II, po 168. 
7Tyier to Philadelphia Fourth of' July Committee, July 2, 18429 in 
ibid., P• 171; 'l'.1ler to MoCandllsh, July 10, 1842, in ibid., po 17'.31 Op.. 
ahur to Nathaniel Bo '1':loker, .July 8, 1842, in ibido, PP• 156-1580 
. ' 
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pay of the military and civil service had on occasion in 1841 been SUS= 
pended by Tyler because the public coffers were emptyo Treaney notes 
declined steadily in value in 1842, and the Home Squadron of the Navy was 
tied up as an economy measu.reo 
.A.s has ~en seen, the third item on Clay• s program was. the raising 
ot an adequate revenue by the impost tion of tariff' duties o The fourth 
I 
item was the prospective distribution among the states of the proceeds 
f'rom the sales of' public lands. Uthe l:ndget deficit were to be wiped 
out, an increase in tariff duties would ha'\re to be madeo The distribltion 
. 
of the proceeds fro_m public land sales would be a great boon to the states, 
many of whioh were staggering under debt bmdena too heavy for them in a 
I 
period of bard times. Inasmuch as ~th Tyler and Clay- nre favorable to 
both tariff' inorease and distril:ntion, it looked as though the task could 
be done. 
In a spec~ message to Co:ngre11 on Maroh 25, 1842, the President 
made a more detinite reoomendation as to the taritto In order to meet 
1 1 I ' 
the expen,es ot government and pr~e tor adequate defense it would be 
necessary- to put the taritt rates above the twenty per cent maximum, set 
by the Compromise .A.ct ot 183'.3, on some import,.nt itemao These rates 
should be made primarily- tor the purpose of' increasing revenue, but would 
necessarily- attord incidental proteot~on to ~uf'aoturers. 'l';Yler ex... 
pressed reg~t tor the necessity- of' departure from the principles ot ~e 
Compromise ot 18'.3'.3, tor aooording to it, when tariff's nre raised above 
tnntr P'.r .cent, the .distribution ot land sale proceeds -~~ au~-
matioallr oeaseo8 
I 
'lbis message proved to be an empty gesture, tor the 'tig maj,ority- in 
8 .Riohardson, edo, Me11yes !!!!. Papers, IV, PPo 108-1090 
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both branches was more inclined to disregard the recommendations or a 
President whom it had rep11diated. _Despite Tyler's insistence on pl'Ompt 
action~ Congress was slow to take up the important revenue questiono 
.J'1nally two bills were passed, one providing tor a provisional and the 
other a pemanent tarif'to '?he provisional .bill, pas111ed on June 25, 1842, 
postponed ft:1r one month the reduction ot rates which were _due to expire 
' 
on Jul:1 1 under the Act ot 18330 It further re~_in., ~he distribution 
olaseo9 'l'b.e pemanent bill, J)l:ssed on August 5, 1842, raised the tantr 
rate above the twent:1 per cent level am provided ft:1r unoondi tional con.. 
tinuanae of diatribitiono This me~sure was carried b:1 a narrow 1T1&1"gin 
in eaoh Bouse.10 
Tyler o_onsidered that C~ngress was morall:1 obligated not to suspend 
~r repeal the Aot of 1833 ~cept under imperative necessit:10 He was 
foroed to adnd.t that tiDancial needs ot the federal treasur;v const!:~ted 
'· 
such an exigenc:1. He would agree to suspend the Compromise of 1833 to 
secure the r:evenue needed by' the government, but he was not willing to 
sacrifice it tor protection or distribltiono He vetoed the provisional 
tariff bill on the grounds that it violated the pnnciple or both the 
Compromise ~d distribution acts}:·~ Tyler t11rther confounded Congress by' 
directing that the revenue continue to be collected under the Act ot 18330 
In doing this he was guided b:1 Legare, his Attorney General, who con... 
eluded that the Act of 1833 could be executed beyond its expiration da:te 
in the absence of turthei' legi~lationo 12 Al, though the question of the 
9congressional Globe, 27th Congo, 2nd sesl!lo9 Po 61.5 0 
lOibido, PPo 762, 8520 
11 
· Richardson, ed~, Messages ,!!!9. Papers, IV, ppo 180=1830 
12Benjamin Fo Hall, edo9 The Mnions ~ ~ Attornev General (4 
volso, Waabingtons Robert Farnum, 1 52); III, po 560 
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basis for the Secretary of t,he Treasury's action in continuing to collect 
. . • 
tariffs was raised i ,n the House II the only action taken by that body was 
· . 13 
to print the report rJt the Committee_ on the Judi:ciaryo The attempts to 
pass the prov1si01'18l. tariff bill over the President9 s veto f'ailedo 
That the Preside;nt would veto the pemanent tariff' bill of August 5 
should have been cl.early evident to anyone who ha4 any f'ai th .in bis 
loyalty to convictiono It would have been the height of inconsistency 
to have accepted this bill after vetoing the provi~onal tariff measureo 
It looked as if the Whig Congress was primarily interes~d in "heading" 
the .Presidento By forcing him to make an unpopular veto at a time when 
the goverm.ent was in di~ finanoial straits would put him in an unfavor-
able light with the pttbli~ and make him ~he scapegoato Nevertheless, T.,ler 
' 
returned the bill to the House with his objectionso His veto message was 
an able state papero His objections were the same as those he presented 
in the veto of the provisional tariff measureo '!he bill 11 which never 
became lawj raised tariff' rates above the twenty per cent level and at 
the same time continued distributionol4 
The jubilation of Clay partisans was unbounded when Tyler vetoed 
both taritr measureso Crittenden wrote Clay, "Ir we can keep up the 
feeling that now exists, yc,ur election is ~ertaino 'l'yler is one of our 
R!!! friends; his last veto o o o just reached the convention in Ma.1.•, 
which nominated~ and deno~ced himo..15 
l'.3u.s., JoU1"!'l&l. !.t lb!, House g,t Representa'ti.vea, 27th .Congo 11 2nd 
sesso, PPo 10,6a,J.0'.37o 
14R1chardson, edo , Messages e, Papers, IV, ppo 183 ... 189 o 
15Arma MoBo Colemanp edo, The Li.f'e of John Jo Crittenden (2 volso, 
Phµadelphias J.B. Lippincott Gd&:";" m'?i'r;-t; p .. 199, cited herein-
after as Coleman; Crittendeno 
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The Whig policy, designed to raise Clay more than revenue, quickly 
' 
shifted to the appointment or a House select committee to investigate the 
reasons given by Tyier for his latest veto of the taritf'-distribltion 
billo As anticipated, the oommi ttee Wl!lS care:f'ully packed to produoe the 
predetermined resulto Cha.ired by John Quincy Adams, and in its heavy 
Whig majority such proven a.nti-Tylerites as Botts, the committee reported 
its findings on August 16, 1842. The document went far beyond a formal 
criticism of' the President0 s veto of' the tariff..,distribution billo It 
was a wide ... ranging, f'ree'"'swinging attack on the Tyler administration from 
the moment it came to powero It recommended an amendment to the Con-
sti1l1.tion that would permit the overriding of' a White House veto by a 
bare majorityo It concluded with the qbservation th8.t Tyler was a fit 
·' subject for impeachment prooeedingso A dissenting minority report; signed 
only by Demoora tio Congressman q_harles Jo Ingersoll of Pennsylvania, al':ld 
Roosevelt of New York, defended the President's stewardship ot the nation 
for the preceding seventeen monthso16 
The severe arraignment of' the majority report was based not on care-
tully sifted evidence but 01'.1 facts .distorted ~y partisanship and l"'W!lor 
colored by hateo When v;!.ewed in an attitude of cool objectivity 1 t ap-
pears more an indictment or the commi ttea than of Tylero The emotional, 
biased statements ma.de in the report cannot be admitted as evidence 
against the President, while they afford irref'utable proof' or the bitter,.. 
ness and unfairness that chu>acterized the findings or the committeeo A 
aounter report, which was in the nature o£ a protest9 was sent in by 
Gilmer9 a member or the "Corpora1°s Gu.ardo" The President was upheld and 
l6qongresaional•<l1.obe9 27th Congo, 2nd seSS01, PJl>o 894..896; the text 
of the minority report is in ibido si PPo 899 ... 901; N1les 0 National Register, 
LXII, PPo '9.5-3970 
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the action of the Hause condemned. Gillner contended that the House in 
tabling the veto am referring the President• s reasons for the veto to a 
committee instead or reconsidering the measure was running counter to 
traditional practice and the spirit or the Consti'blt.1.on .. 17 
The majority report was adopted by the House by a vote or 98 to 90. 
The adoption of' the report led the Presid~nt to send a protest to the 
House on August JO, 1842. This was a dignified statement expressing 
strong arguments f'c>roe:rul.ly expressed. In making these accusations, 
Congress had been unjust to him as a man, had infringed upon his powers 
as Chief Executive, and had viol,ated the rights of' ever:, citi.zen granted .. . \ 
in the C,onst.1. tuticm. 'lyler continued I 
I have been accused wit.ho.ut evidence and condemned with-
out a heanng •• o • I am charged with violating pl.edges which 
I never gave • • • with u1nrping powers ~t oonterred by lawp 
and, -.bove all, with using the poars oonterred upon the 
President by the Constitution from cor1"11pt motives a?d un-
warrantable ends. And these charges are made without • 
particle or evidence to sustain them, am, as I solemnly tr-
tirm, without any foundation ·or tl'l.lth.18 
The whole proceeding or the ~se he characterized as in the interest of . . . 
one side only and extrajudioialo If he were gull ty of the high crimes as 
charged, then Congress should have employed the method of' impeachment and 
triai .. 19. 
Tyler dispatched his defense or his behavior to the House w1 th the 
reqnest that it be printed in the House Jqurnal. as a solemn and formal . 
declaration against i1'ljustice and the unconstitutionality or sueh pro-
ceedings. This entreaty was ref'used, and gleetul Whigs pointed out that 
l7eo:ngressional gLobe, 27th Cong., 2nd sesso, PPo 896-899. 
18Ibido, P• 899. 
19 
Richardsen, ed •• Messages!!!! Papers, IV, pp .. 190-193 .. 
Tyler himself' had resigned from the Senate rather than vote to deny-
Jaokson the same priTUege in 1834.20 
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In the midst of' rene~ assau;L t, Tyler signed into law the eon.-
troversial Ta:r'1tt Act of 1842, a bill pushed thro11gh by' an alliance of 
protectionist Whigs and I)emoorats. Congress was becoming alarm,d by' the 
stark emptiness of' the Treasury. In this sense it was regarded by its 
baekers as a tarltf' for much needed revenue, and it did return sOllle 
tarU't schedules to the high rates of 1632. There was no distribution 
rider attached. Tyler• s approval or the measure was at varianoe w1 th his 
long standing hostility to-.rd high taritts. Bl!lt the Treasunr was desper-
ate terr a new infusion ot· tunds, ~d half' a loaf' was better than none.2l. 
Whate:ver his motives in signing the Tariff' Act of 1842, ~er was 
) 
clearly unsettled and llurt by concul"l'ent Whig talk of impeachment. He 
knew tba t the Whigs did not haTe the votes to acoomplish su.oh a radical 
solution to their. frllstrations, bllt the chattering itself angered~ and 
I 
drove him even closer to the Democracy tor aid and c~ort. '!he impeach-
ment moTement began in July, 1842, at which time a resolution was intro-
i;mced in the House by Botts calling for the appointment at a special 
ocmmittee .to investigate the President's condliot of' of'tioe with a 'lfiew 
toward recommending impeachment. Clay a~ed that "the ine'lfitable tenden-
cy of events is to impeachment," mt he felt the timing and in~duotion 
of the Botts motion was unf'o!'tunate. He believed that the politics of' tb.e 
•, ' 
situati.on oll].ed for lesH.r punishment au.oh as a Hous,- vote ot "want of'. 
oontidenee" in 'l'y1.er rather than tormal impeachment proceedings. \td.le 
he enooul"l.ged the impe~chment movement behind the soe:nes, Clay urged th.at 
20eongressional Globe, 27th Cqng., 2nd sess., PP• 973.975:· 
21.Ibi.d., PP• 912; 923-926, 973. 
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it proceed with great care. It had proceeded practically nowhere when 
Tyler learned of it and fairly exploded, "I.am told that one of the mad-
caps talks of impeachment.•22 
Congress adjourned on August '.31, 1842, to face ,their constituents in 
the elections of' that year. The results or the 1842 elections would seem 
to rep11diate the Whigs in Congress, for their majority in both Houses was 
cut drastically. In the session which met in December; 1842, Whigs wot!ld 
need to rely on much support from Democrats to get measures passed, £,or 
the Whigs were hopelessly spl.i t. Tyler delivered his annual message to 
an apathetic Congress which listened with a pronounced indifferenceo The 
President asked for a downward revision of tariff and the adoption of his 
Erohequer plan. He ~nsisted that Congress pass a bill to reimburse Jack-
son a thousand dollars for a fine levied in 1815 when the General was in 
command of' .New Orleans. Tyler asked for little more, nor did he expect 
more, f'rcm what was probably the most obstinate Congress a President ever 
tried to work w1 th. 2'.3 
The first attempts to impeach the President never got beyond the 
discussion stage, but Botts was not content to let the mat~r dieo On 
Jarmary 10, 184'.3, he introduced his impeaohnent resolution in the Houseo 
Be recommended that a committee of' nine members be appointed with in-
structions to diligent.ly inquire into the trath of nine charges which he 
made against the President. Generally, Botts charged the President with 
gross usurpation or power in exercising inf'luence and control over the 
Treasury ·and with high crimes and misdemeanors in aiding and exciting a 
22clay to CJ-ittenden, July 16, 1842• in Ot,leman, Crittenden, I, p. 
201; Tyler to McCandlish, July 10, 1842, in Tyler, Lri.ters and Times, II, 
PP• 173-174. · 
23R1.chardson, ed., Messages !.!!l Papers, IV, P• 194. 
revolutio.nary spirit in the country. He charged Tyler with arbitrary, 
despoti_c and corrupt abuse of the veto power. All nine charges were 
vague. The House, however, brought the resolution to a vote. It was 
soundly defeated by a vote of 8'.3 to 127.24 Only the most extreme Clay 
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and Van Buren men 8\1.pported it. "There was," reported Senator David 
O.rdiner, who witnessed the vote, "no excitement and littl.e debate, and 
this ••• foolish attempt will only result in increasing the number of 
the ,resident's friends."25 
Though the President was scorned and villitied during the remainder . 
of his te~, this .was the last attempt of Congress to take official action 
against him. Well managed as it was, his administration still remaiDed a 
caretaker operation. His crime, if' th~re 'was one, seemed to be an over 
sealous attachment to his states• rights doctrine and a very strict con-
struction or the Constitution. He faced ostracism from his party and 
alienation ot triends to stand by principles in which he firmly believed .. 
Tyler would not be cowed by a Clay dominated Congress. 
24oongressional. Globe, 27th Cong., 3rd sass., pp .. 144-146 .. 
250. Gardiner to A. Gardiner, January 11, 1843, 1n Tyler, Letters 
!D! Ti.mes, II, P• 2'.31 .. 
CHAPTER VI 
CPNOLUSIONS 
Tyler's veto of the second bank.bill and his subsequent ouster from 
the ranks at the Whig party- mark the ~nal l'llpture between the President 
and Congress. The relationship of the two branches during the next two 
sessions was strained to the . point that no constructive legislation came 
torth. The third session, which saw Botts resolution ar impeachment, was 
an aft.er.math to the great conf'l.iot ot 1841. Attar the special session 
' 
was adjoumed on September 13, 1841·, CongreH conducted its blisiness at 
one end of Pe:nnqlvania A.venue and the President conducted bis bu.siness 
at the other end. There was littJ.e oomunioation betwen the two branches 
apart from the necess&l'Y' mininmm• 
1he President was overly- sensitive to the charge of dictating to 
Congress. He .. :was, there~ore, rel~ctant to take the initiative .in legis-
lative leadership. The tramers of the Const.1.tu;tion did ~ot clearly de-
fine the President• s legislative role, but left this problem to be worked 
out by' 'later statesmen. The President• s initiative in the legislative 
process, .it }?.e has an.y at all, is at best held precariously. Under the 
system ot oheoks and bala~es, th~ Chiet EICeautive can be held pretty mu.oh 
in check by Oongreaa through i ta powers to . control the purse a.nd the power 
ot approv~ or .disapproval ot many ot 'bis actions. A.side from the dmces 
of party, which a President may utili•e with varying degr,es of sk:;lll., the 
legal tools ,mieh give him a share 1n the legislative prooess are few 1n 
number. Viewed in a broad sense, the probl1111 of legislative relationship 
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or the Pt-esident to Congress involves the two steps or proposing and aP-
proving legislation. Bat the Constitution is vague as to '1ba.t degree the 
two bran~hes may proceed to accomplish either or both stepso ,ntring the 
twentieth century we have come to the solution that the executive pro-
poses legislation while ~he legislature performs the tunc~on or de-
liberation in granting or w!:t~lding approval. By contrast, the 
nineteenth century was marked by legislative ascendency over the execu-
tive, who was still identi:t.ied to a marked degree with absolute l"W.eo1 
It is in this context that the struggles between President Tyler and 
Congress over the question or legis;J.a.tive initiative a.rd approval should 
be considered. The Ja.ekson and Tyler administrations mark a point of 
crisis involving the executive-legislative rel~tionship. Jackson could 
interrupt the pel"iGd or legislative supremacy because he, and not 
Congress, was the symbol of the newly enfranchised masses. Tyler played 
no such symbolic role, . and yet his states' rights oomiotions foroed him 
to use the veto vigorously and thereby to thwart the determined bid of 
the \id.gs in Congress to impose upon the President both Clay's program 
and the doctrine or legislative guardianship over the execmtiveo The 
struggle for supremacy between the executive and the l~slative branches 
during Tyler's administration was a one-sided affairo The legislative 
branch, which early' seiz~d the initiative, forced Tyler into a defensive 
position, .and his only effective weapon was the veto • 
. In the ~er adm:1.nistraticm the struggle over the legislative process 
took plaoe between one of the greatest ot all Congressional leaders ·and 
I ' ,, 
one ot the moat obstinate or .Presidents. 2 It took a to1"111 wh.1ch was 
lm.nkley, Pr1sident ~ Congress, PP• 36-41. 
2Arthur N_ Holcombe, Ollr ~ Pert,et Union(Cambridges Huvard 
Un:lversity Press, 1950), pp. 99, 252-25). 
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dictated as much by circumstances as by personali tieso Clay •s an 
original National Republican who became a Whig when Jackson identified 
the Presidency with the interests or the f'armer am small industrialist. 
He represented the capitalist's interests in Congress. While Tyler •s 
perfectly w.\111.ng to bear the ruun~ Whig, he saw no inconsistency in his 
opposition to National Repibl.icanism in any form, including Clay's 
"American Systemo" Both had come into the Whig ranks with only one thing 
in common -- their opposition to Jacksonian policieso 
The most notable fact which contributed to the failure of' Tyler to 
become chief legislator during his administration was that he umost never 
I 
told Congress precisely what detailed legislation he thonght should be 
enactedo lt>reover, . Tyler was guilty of' this omission at times when 
positive action would quite probably have saved him political embarrass-, 
ment. He sought careMl.y to avoid raising the cey that his actions 
constituted dictation to . Congrees. In short, with very few exceptions, 
Tyler consichtred it to be the President's function to inform bu.t not to 
lead Congress. In his anmal messages to Congress Tyler rarely made a 
detailed recommendat.1,.on, but he did touch on the major problems or the 
day. Frequently, as in his message to the special session or the twenty .. 
seventh Congress am in his first. annual message in December, 1841, he 
indiaated to Congress that, sh8'1ld that. body desire it, he would suanit 
the det.a~ed pla.ns drawn up by the heads or departmentso He was willing 
to say that something should be done by Congress, but he was unwill.1ng to 
say how it should be done. Tlms • there was virtually no exeeuti ve bill-
drafting in the Tyler administratior. Also, bis direct S11pporters in 
Congress were so few in :number that he did not even enjoy the advantage 
or. having his followers in key committee posts where they might have 
dratted bills for him. 
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In his first message to the special session of' the Twenty-Seventh 
Congress, Tyler refrained from urging the very measures which he knew 
• were closest to the hearts of' the Whigs descended from the National. Re-
publican schoolo He considered it undesirahle either to urge the creation 
of a bank in any way resembling the first and second Banks of the United 
States or to seek an ~~ase in the protective ta.riff. Since the 
program of internal improvements and the distribution of the proceeds 
from the sales of public lan~s depended upon the continuation of a high 
tariff', Tyler had no enthusiasm f'or these measures. On April 30, 1841, 
Tyl,r told Clay that. he hoped th:at the Whig leader wul.d not urge the 
bank prem.aturely~·~bu.t if Clay insisted, he hoped that the bank would be 
so framed as 0 to avoid oonst.itutional objections.3 By his letter to Clay 
and his message to the special session, Tyler and Clay each knew rather 
cl.early where the o~er stood, although the Whigs later made a great 
point of expressing surprise over the President•s veto of the two bank 
bills.4 It should have been crystal olear to Tyler that if Clay led the 
Whigs to accept a legislative progl"am embodying his pet measures, he 
wcnld either have to bow to tb.ei.r wishes or use the veto power to 
thwart them. Despite his ~owl.edge of' the s1 ~tion, Tyler chose not to 
assume the legislative initia~ve. It appears that he did not intend to 
follow any other. course of action. 
Tyler, in praotioally all his dea11ngs with Congress, adhered ,o ,.,., 
o.ardinal Whig prinoiples. The PJ;oesident would not presume to know be~ter 
than Congress, the more immediate representat.ives of the people, what 
3'l'he text of 'l'yler'.s message to the special session of' Congress is 
in Richardson, ed., Messages !.!!!. Pandrs, IV, PP• 40-51; Tyler to Clay, 
April 30, 1841, in Tyler, Letters .SL Tim.es, II, P• 320 
4Poage, Remey: .Qlfz, PP• 68-72, 99, 106. 
• 
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scheme of finance ought to be formulated. He indicated what he thought 
the people plai,nly showed they did not want -- pet banks, a national bank, 
ud a su.btreaSU17 - bit it was unbecClllling of' him to say what. the people 
did want. In short, he conceived it to be the function of the executive 
t9 Worm but not .to lead Congress, while reserving to himself' the power 
to judge both the oonsti tutionali ty am the propriety of such measures as 
Congress might enact. Congress could go its way, and the Pl-esident would 
permit the powers or his office, except the veto, to languish.5 
Arter the legislative storms of the SW'lllller of 1841, Tyler shifted his 
' . 
position slowly bit noticeably by taking a somewhat more positive stand. in 
making proposals deali~ with financial. problems. He told Congress in his 
first annual message that the Secretary of the Treasury would be ready to 
submit a plan of finance "should you require it.,,6 Here Tyler referred 
to his Elt'Chequer plan to whiah he hAd perso111.lly given careful thoa.ght in 
the interval since the two bank bill vetoes of the previous ~r. In 
f~ct, he felt th,&t the country expected him to f'ol'!lllllate some bank plan 
in view of the vetoes, bit he entered upon the task with little en-
thusiasm.? The President left with Congress the initiative in frad.ng 
laws unless Congress saw fit to call upon him for his pl.ans. 
Br ·March, 1842, Tyler .became alarmed at the diat.reasing state of' the 
public 'treasury. He forwarded to the House a: .;r•port or the Secretary of 
the Treasury indicat:µig that a large deficit was anticipated at that time. 
In this message he said tha~ he was subnd tting th.• suggestions made by the 
5Ri.ohardson, ed., Messages!.!!! Papers, IV, p. 42. 
6 Ibid., PP• 84-67. 
?Tyler to Ta1ewll; October 11, 1841, in Tyler Papers, II, 6409, 
J.,ibrary ot Congress. 
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Secretary and invited the prompt action of Congress. \<\hen no quick action 
was forthcoming from Congress, he sent a message on March 25, this time to 
8 both Houses, in which he detailed plans to meet the financial crisiso In 
this message Tyler outlined spec~fic steps which he considered necessary. 
'lhe tone was sufficiently imperative to attract the attention of Congress 
am the country alike. It marked the first and only occasion in which 
Tyler tried to seize the legislative initiative by sending Congress a 
program of action. His relations with both parties were such by this time 
that his plea for a suspension of partisanship fell on deaf ears. Tyler 
did not take this course willingly, but was forced to take the initiative 
because of an inactive Congress and a deep concern for the financial 
crisis. 
In his actions as Chief Executive, Tyler emphatically rejected the 
notion that the Presi~ent was subject to the guardianship of either Con-
gress or his cabinet. When the ~igs asserted that the cabinet was a 
council by which the President must be gu.ided in making policy, Tyler en-
couraged the resignation of every member of the group selected by Harrison 
and subservient to Clay. He did this in the face of what he thought was 
a plot to force his resignation from thA Presidency for lack of department 
heads. , Al~hough he added nothing to the theory of the appointive power, 
he was careful to avoi~ what he thought was Jackson's abuse of the au-
thority to make recess appointments. 
It is one of the paradoxes of the office that the President must seek 
to balance his position as chief of his party with an equal need for 
support of his policies from all ,quarters of the natioi:i regardless of 
partisan lineso He owed his office to the efforts of the party which put 
him there and, yet once in power, his success as a leader rests in no 
8 
Richardson, ed., Messages ~ Papers, IV, ppa 102, 106-111. 
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small measure upon securing a broad base of popular approval .. In driving 
away the Whig irreconcilables under Clay am appealing to the nation for 
support. of bis meanres, Tyler fail~ to achieve this delicate and veey 
necessary equilibrium. It his press had been good, 'l',Y'ler might have 
achieved a considerable amount of support for himself .. He might have 
displayed himself' to the public and thereby brought the battl.e to his op.. 
ponent.s. But he was schooled in the retirix;ig and gentlemanly pol.itics of 
Virginia, where the office sought the ma.no Only once did he travel 
through a part of the nation, and that was to Boston for the dedication . . ' 
of the Bunker Bill Monument in. June, 1842. His Whig opponents sneered at 
this gest\U"e, and ,Adams absolutely refused to appear on the same platform 
with 'l',Y'ler. Adams claimed that 'l',Y'ler was trying to "whistle back" his 
Whig friends that he had cast off and to receive the homage or hungry 
flattere:rs under the g11ise ot •doing homage to the principles er Banker 
Hill •• 9 
· It is undn.btedly due to the bias or a number of historians that 
'l',Y'ler has been so long maligned as a vascillating, treacherous, un-
yielding a~d vain ma.n who was one of the worst Presidents., 10 His reat>rd 
in office demonstrates that he was a man ot c.ourage, honesty, and de-
termination who chose to foUow a course ot policy which he thc;,u.ght 
served the pt1blio good better than the one proposed by Clay. Had he de-
cided to play the role of a manageable nonentity, he might well enjoy 
today the reputation of h:8,rlng been a patriotic althou.gh a colorless 
President. Be retuaed to ~o so am thereby precipitated an extraordinary 
9A.dams, ed., Memoirs, X, p. 382. 
lOThis view is expressed in Chitwood, .i.!!!!, Tyler, Po 371; Binkley, 
President SJ!, Congress, p .. 99; and Poage, Henry Claz, p. 99 .. 
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struggle f,or institu~onal dominance within our constituti~nal systemo 
Unfortunately f'or Tyler, his opponent was the great statesman Clay, 
who was the aclmolil.edged Whig leader from the inception of' the party in 
the mid-18JO'so Clay had an intense ambition to be President, and as the 
years passed his desire for the office increased. His Presidential as-
pirations had suffered setbac.ks along tbe way. In 1832 he was defeated 
by Jackson and in 1836 the fledgling Whig party saw fit to support others. 
Clq was bitterly disappointed in 1839 when the Whig convention tailed to 
nominate him for the Pre~dency. He eagerly looked forward to the 
elections of 1844, for Harrison, o;Ld and infirm, declared his intention 
to serve one tezm only. But Harrison died and Tyler came into ~f'tice, 
and he oould become a stumbling blo.ok on Clay• s road to the Wb1 te &use, 
for Tyler was not bound by a one term declaration. It wa.s not difficult 
for Clay to hold his position as leader ~f Congress and the Whig party 
against a President who did not feel he shwld lead. Clay early seized 
the initiative by proposing a plan of action for Cengress. But he mat 
move carefully, tor an administration which did not discredit Tyler in 
the eyes of the Whigs and the people would make him a logic&]. candidate 
in 1844. Clay gauged his opponent accurately when he assumed that he 
would stick by his principles of a low tariff am no bank. '!he fiscal 
area was, therefore, the best way to put Tyler in an embarrassing position 
due to the Cl'itical :finances ~r the Treasury. The two bank bills of' 1841 
and the tariff bills of 1842 were passed by a Clay dominated Congress with 
the expectation that the Presidential veto power would be exercisedo 
These measures brought . the .desired results, fer 'l'y'ler•s vetoes alienated 
I I ' I 
him from the ~g Party and gained the emnity of the peopleo By the time 
Congress met in December, 1842, 'l'y'ler was an impo~nt man politicallyo 
Overall, 'l'y'ler• s term was one continuaus poli Ucal campaign, tor the 
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desire to elect Clq to the Presidency in 1844 was behind virtually all 
the attempts at legislation made by the Whig Congress. The br1lliant 
Kentuckian, knowing Tyler was dead as a political enemy, withdrew from 
the Senate on March '.31, 1842, and went home to look after his private af-
fairs and devote his energies to the campaign for the Presidency.11 Clay 
received the ~g nomination in 1844, 'but was defeated by Polk in the 
elections. 
Tyler probably did not enhance the prestige of the Presidency., The 
villification or his administration by his contemporaries was so intense 
and pervasive as to make an;y:thing Tyler did hagardous at best. Tyler de .. 
S9l"Ves admiration for his political courage as well as for his honesty of 
conviction and personal. dignity in office. It pewer is nc,u.rished with use, 
the Presidency did not languish in his hands. His vetoes were in defense 
of the Constitution as h_e understood it and his protest message was for 
the purpose ot protecting the executive power. Courteous in bis ot!'ioial 
dealings with Congress, he successf"ul.ly resisted evr,ry ef'f'ort of the 
Congressional opposition to violate the pr~iple that neither branch 
shauld encroach upon the powers of the other or abdicate its proper 
ttinotions within the constitutional scheme. In doing so, he learned that 
his own views of the proper scope of the President's powers had to be 
molded to fit the circumstances in which they were exercised., 
The q11estion as to whethe~ ·Tyl.er added some intangibl.e meaS11re or 
influence to the Presidency has no q11antitative answero In the absence 
of qua.li ties of leadership in Tyler, one is forced to view his admini~-
tration from the standpoint of' his contribution to the theory of' the 
Presideney and his actions in using the powers bequeathed him by his 
11Clay to Brook, March 29, 1842, in Schurz, Henry Cla:y, II, p. 222. 
& • • -
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predecessorso He determined for the future the tradition that a Presi-. . . 
dent by accident may use his official ponrs with a vigor and purpose 
undiminished by his peolil:iar position. Like Jackson a1one before him, 
Tyler stood adamant in defending his office against the Whig dogma of' 
legislative guardianship of the executive. '!he struggles of' his ad-
ministration nre largely those fought by Jackson over the same issues, 
with the same napou, am among many of' the same adversaries. The 
\>angs came to power in 1840 determined to restore to the legislature the 
dominance over the executive which was lost under Jacksono They would 
have succeeded had it mt been for a President by accident who stood by 
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or Congress, Washington, D. c. 
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and Co., 1854-1858. 
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during his many years of public service. Bens a severe critic of 
Tyler, but not vindictive. 
Binkley, Wilfred E. President !!12. Congress. New York: A. A. Knopf, 1947. 
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supported ,Tyler• s states• rights views. Calhoun became Secretary or 
State under Tyler after Daniel Webster resigned, and played an im-
portant part in the Texas negotiations. 
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John Tyler by his youngest .son. It also contains comments by the 
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